THE SOULES Own evidence, for its own IMMORTALITY.

In a very pleasant and learned discourse,
Selected out of that excellent Treatise entituled,
The trunesse of Christian Religion, against Atheists, Epicures, &c.

First compiled in French by Famous Phillip Mornay, Lord of Plessie Marlie, *afterward turned into English by Eloquent Sir* Phillip Sydney, *and his assistant, Master* Arthur Golden, *Anno Domini M D LXXX VII.*

And now re-published.

By *John Bachiler* Master of Arts, somtimes of *Emanuell* Colledge in *Cambridge.*

Pnblished according to Order.

LONDON,
Printed by *M. S.* for *Henry Overton* in Popes-head Ally, 1646.

To the Reader.

IUdicious Reader, the iniquity of the times, having ſo far corrupted the minds of ſome, that the very *innate and inbred principles of Nature* (eſpecially about a *Deity*, the *ſovereigne welfare* and the *Immortality of the Soule*) ſeeme in a manner to be quite *obliterated and extinct* in them; I thought it would not be unſeaſonable, to recommend to thy moſt ſerious Meditations, that excellent Treatiſe mentioned in the Frontiſpiece, as an *Antidote* againſt the *Atheiſticall* and *dangerous* Tenets now abroad.

The Noble Authour of it thou wilt ſoone find was a man of no meane parts, and of no *common* Learning. *Delicacy* of Wit, *ſtrength* of Reaſon, *ſtreams* of Eloquence, with *varieties* both of *ſolid* and *curious* notions, come all flowing from him. Hee will tell thee more, even from the *Ancient* doctrine of the very *Heathen*, than happily thou ever heard'ſt of, or (at leaſtwiſe) ever tookeſt much notice of, *though borne and bred* in ſo *bright* an Age, and among ſuch too, as paſſe for no meane Proficients in *Chriſtianity*. Thoſe *Myſterious* (though glorious) Truths, which like Mines of Gold under ground, run along more hiddenly, through the letter of the Scriptures, thou maiſt there meet with diſcuſſed at large, with as much *ſobriety* as *cleerneſſe*.

To the Reader.

Doſt thou deſire to know by what arguments, *even of reaſon*, thou maiſt prove a *Deity?* that Deity to be but *one only?* and yet diſtinguiſhed by a Trinity of Beings, that which wee call a *Trinity* of perſons, *viz. Father, Son*, and *Spirit?* if thou wilt take the pains, (I might ſay, the pleaſure rather) to gaine the knowledge of ſuch *high* (yet *neceſſary*) points: In the firſt ſix Chapters of the ſaid Treatiſe, thou maiſt (more fully than thou art aware) inſtruct thy ſelf.

Doſt thou enquire after the higheſt and moſt *ſovereigne Good?* wherein it lyeth, and wherein it lyeth not? in the 18 and 19 Chapters thou findeſt that alſo very ſweetly and fully reſolved.

Laſtly, next unto the knowledge of God what hee is in Himſelf, and what to His creatures, doſt thou ſeek to underſtand thy Self, what once thou wert, and what ſtill thou art; Read but this enſuing *Paragraph*, peculiarly ſelected out for thy preſent uſe, and thou ſhalt eaſily perceive what *Divine* [a] *ſparks* lye *raked* up under aſhes, within thine *own boſome*, *ſparks* which (when [b] once ſtirred up) do but blow a little, and thou ſhalt know farther, as well what the *duration* as the *excellencie* of thy *being* is, And that thou art a creature bearing in thee, *beſides a plurality* [c] *of preſent lives*, the very ſeed of *Immortality*.

In all which ſeverall enquiries whilſt thou readeſt and conſidereſt, thou maiſt expect that, the *reaſonable* part (darke and cloudy, no twithſtanding as it may be) ſhall quickly receive an *Irradiation*, and that not onely from the *intrinſecall operations* of thine own minde, but alſo from the *conſent* of the *wiſeſt* men among all Nations.

Zo-

a *Igniculi ſcintillantes.* Onuphr. de Anima.

b Σπέρμα πυρὸς. Homer. Odys. 5.

c חיים נשמת Gen. 2 7.

To the Reader.

Zoroaſtres the *Chaldean*, *Triſmegiſtus* the *Ægyptian*, *Orpheus* the *Greeke*, *Pherecides* the *Syrian*, after them, *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Amelius*, *&c*, all teach thee in their ſeverall ages. And if that be not ſufficient, Thou haſt the *confeſsion* of the very *Devils*; *viz.* that there is *a God*, and but *one God*, with *Trinity* of *perſons in unitie of Eſſence*. That the *Soul* is an *Immortall* ſubſtance, and the aforeſaid *Deity*, The *ſovereigne welfare* of it, according to what thou believeſt from the only true *ſacred Oracle*.

Let not then that Treatiſe, *rare and ſingular*, as it is be neglected by thee, for though it hath a long time lyn obſcurely, as a *Diamond* in the dark, little knowne and leſſe looked after, yet I dare ſay, by that time thou haſt well examined it, and ſhalt have taſted the *ſublime Heavenly* matter conteined in it, thou wilt eſtimate it at a very great value, even worthy (many paſſages of it) to be written in *characters of gold*.

Buy it therefore and read it, that from the very *light of nature*, thou mayſt be enabled to confute *blaſphemers*: Judge the whole by this little piece, which if thou readeſt thorough, and with diligent attention, thou mayſt benefit thy ſelfe, and therein anſwer the deſire of him, who heartily wiſheth the *true good of*

Thine Immortall ſoul:

JOHN BACHILER.

That the Soul of Man is immortall, or dyeth not.

HItherto I have treated of the world that is to be conceived in understanding, and of the sensible World (as the *Platonists* tearm them) that is to say, of God and of this World. Now followeth the examining of the little World (as they terme it) that is to say, of man. Concerning God, we have acknowledged him to be a Spirit: and as touching the world we have found it to be a body. In man we have an abridgement of both, namely of God in respect of spirit, and of the world in composition of body as though the Creator of purpose to set forth a mirrour of his works, intended to bring into one little compasse both the *infiniteness of his own nature*, and also the *hugeness* of the *whole world* together. We see in mans body a wonderfull mixture of the foure Elements, the veyns spreading forth like Rivers to the utteruost members; as many instruments of sense, as there be sensible natures in the world, a great number of sinews, flesh-strings and knitters; a head by speciall priviledge directed up to Heavenward, and hands serving to all manner of services. Whatsoever he is that shall consider no more but onely this instrument, without life, without sense and without moving; cannot but thinke verily that it is made to very great purpose; and he must needs cry out as *Hermes* or as the *Sarzin Abtala* doth, that man is a miracle which far surmounteth, not onely these lower Elements, but also the very Heaven and all the ornaments thereof. But if he could (as it were out of himself) behold this body receiving life, and entering into the use of all his motions with such forwardnesse, hands bestirring themselves so nimbly, and after so sundry fashions, and the Senses uttering their force so far off, without stirring out of their place: thinke you not that he would be wonderfully ravished, and so much more wonder at the said life, moving and sense, than at the body, as he wondered afore at the body, to behold the excellencie of the proportion thereof above the masse of some stone? For what comparison is there betweene a *Lute and a Lute-player*, or betweene a dumbe instrument, and him that maketh it to sound? What would hee say then if he could afterward see how the same man being now quickned attaineth in one moment from the one side of the earth to the other, *without shifting of place*; *descending* downe to the *centre* of the world, and *mounting* up above the out-

Man is both Soul and body.

termost

termoſt circle of it both at once; preſent *in a thouſand places at one* inſtant, imbracing the whole *without touching it*, *keeping* upon the earth, and *yet containing* it; beholding the Heavens from *beneath*, and being *above the Heaven of Heavens both at once?* Should he not bee compelled to ſay, that in this ſilly body there dwelleth a greater thing then the body, greater then the earth, yea greater then the whole world together? Then let us ſay with *Plato*, that man is double, outward, and inward. The outward man is that which we ſee with our eys which forgoeth not his ſhape when it is dead, no more then a Lute forgoeth his ſhape when the Lute-player ceaſeth from making it to ſound howbeit that both life, moving, ſenſe, and reaſon be out of it. The inward man is the *Soule*, and that is *properly* the *very man*, which uſeth the body as an inſtrument; whereunto though it be united by the power of God, yet doth it not remove when the body runneth. It ſeeth when the eyes be ſhut, and ſometimes *ſeeth not* when the eyes be wide open: It *travelleth* while the body *reſteth*, and *reſteth* when the body *travelleth*, that is to ſay, it is able of it ſelfe to performe his own actions, without the help of the outward man, whereas on the contrary part the outward without the help of the inward, that is to wit, the body without the preſence of the Soule, hath neither ſenſe moving life, no, nor continuance of being. In the outward man we have a Counterfet of the whole world, and if you rip them both up by piecemeale, ye ſhall finde a wonderfull agreement betwixt them. But my purpoſe in this book is not to treat of the things that pertain peculiarly to the body.

In the inward man wee have a ſumme of whatſoever life ſence and moving is in all creatures, and moreover an Image or rather a ſhadow (for the Image is defaced by our ſinne) of the Godhead it ſelf. And that is the thing which wee have to examine in this Chapter. In Plants, we perceive that beſides their bodies which wee ſee, there is alſo an inward vertue which we ſee not, whereby they live, grow, bud, and beare fruit: which vertue wee call the quickening Soule, and it maketh them to differ from Stones and Metalls, which have it not. In ſenſitive living things, we finde the ſelfeſame vertue, which worketh while they ſleep and are after a ſort as the Plants; and here withall we finde another certaine vertue or power which ſeeth, heareth ſmelleth, taſteth, and feeleth; which alſo in many of them doth *record* up the things brought in by the

the ſences; which manner of power the Plants are void of. This do we terme the ſenſitive Soule, becauſe the effects thereof are diſcerved and executed by the Sences. In man we have both the quickning and the Senſitiue, the former uttering it ſelf in the nouriſhing and increaſing of him, and the latter in the ſubtility of ſence and imagination, where through he is both Plant and Beaſt together. But yet moreover wee ſee alſo a Mind which conſidereth and beholdeth, which reapeth profit of the things that are brought in by the Sences, which by his *ſeeing* conceiveth that which it *ſeeth not*; which of that which *is not*, gathereth that which *is*; & finally which pulleth a man away both from earth and from all ſenſible things, yea and (after a ſort) from himſelf too. This doe we call the reaſonable Soule, and it is the thing that maketh man to bee *man*, (and not a Plant or a brute Beaſt as the other two do,) and alſo to be the Image or rather a ſhadow of the Godhead, in that (as we ſhall ſay hereafter) it is a Spirit that may have continuance of being alone by it ſelfe without the bodie. And by the way, whereas I ſay that the inward man hath a quickening power as a Plant hath, a ſenſitiue power as a Beaſt hath, and a power of underſtanding wherby he is a man: my meaning is not that he hath three Soules but onely one Soule; that is to wit, that like as in the brute Beaſt the ſenſitive Soule comprehendeth the quickening Soule; ſo in man the reaſonable Soule comprehendeth both the ſenſitive and the quickening, and executeth the offices of them all three, ſo as it both liveth, feeleth, and reaſoneth even as well and after the ſame manner, as the mind of a man may intend to his own houſehold-matters, to the affaires of the Commonweale, and to heavenly things all at once. Or to ſpeake more fitly, theſe three degrees of Soules are *three degrees of life*, whereof the ſecond exceedeth and conteineth the firſt, and the third exceedeth and conteineth both the other two. The one, without the which the bodie cannot live, is the Soule or life of the Plant, and is ſo tied to the bodie, that it ſheweth not it ſelfe in any wiſe out of it. The ſecond, which cannot live without the bodie, is the Soule or life of the Beaſt, which doth well utter forth his power and force abroad, but yet not otherwiſe then by the members and inſtruments of the body whereunto it is tyed. The third, which can of it ſelfe live and continue vvithout the body, but not the body vvithout it, is the ſoule of man vvhich giveth life inwardly to all his parts, ſheweth forth his life abroad

In Man are three abilities of Soule.

in the perceiving of all things subject to sence, and retaineth still his force (as shall be said hereafter) yea and increaseth it, even when the strength of the body and the very liuelinesse of the sences fail. And in very deed, you shall see a man forgoe all his sences one after another as the instruments of them decay, and yet have still both life and reason *unappaired*. The cause whereof is, that some of the instruments of life and sense doe faile, but the life it selfe vvhich quickneth them fayleth not. And therefore the Beast forgoeth not life in losing sense, but hee utterly forgoeth sence in forgoing life. And that is because life is the ground of the abilities of sense, and the sensitive life is a more excellent life than the quickning life, as wherein those powers and abilities are as in their *root*. To be short, he that bereaveth man or beast of the use of sences, or man of the right use of reason, doth not thereby bereave him of life; but he that bereaveth the beast or the outward man of their life, doth therewithall bereave them of sence and reason. Therefore it is a most sure argument, that the soule which causeth a beast to live, and the soule that causeth it to have sence, are both one, that is to wit, one certain kind of life more lively and more excellent than the life that is in Plants. And likewise that the soule vvhich causeth man to live, to have sence, and to reason, is but one, that is to vvit, one certain kinde of life more excellent, more lively, and of further reach, than the life of the Beast. But like as sence is as it vvere the forme or *Selfebeing* (if I may so terme it) of the life of a beast; so is *reason* or understanding the very forme and *Selfebeing* of the soule of man; and (to speak properly) it is the soule or life of the soule, life as the *apple* of our eye is the very *eye of our eye*. And in very deed, vvhen the minde is earnestly occupied the sences are at a stay; and vvhen the sences are overbusied, the nourishment and digestion is hindered; and contrariwise: vvhich thing could not come to passe if the soule vvere any more than one substance, vvhich by reason that it is but one, cannot utter his force alike in all places at once, but yeeldeth the lesse care one vvhere so long as it is earnestly occupyed another where. In this soule of man (vvhich yet notwithstanding is but one) the diversity of the powers and abilities is very apparant. The quickning power doth nourish, increase and maynteine us; and Reason and Sence meddle not therewith, neyther have they power to impeach the working thereof. The truth whereof appeareth in this, that these things are best done when

when our mind is at reſt, and our ſences are aſleep; inſomuch that oftentimes we forg'd the ſence and moving of ſome parts by ſome Rheume or ſome Palſey, and yet the ſame parts ceaſſe not to be nouriſhed ſtill. Alſo, the ſenſitive life ſeeth and perceiveth a far off, yea oftentimes without ſetting of the mind thereupon, or without conſidering what the Sence conceiveth. Some men which have but weak Sences, have very quicke underſtanding; and likewiſe on the contrary part. Againe, ſome fall into a Conſumption, which want not the perfect uſe of their Sences. Sometime the reaſonable part is ſo earneſtly bent and occupied about the things that it liketh of, that by the increaſing of it ſelfe, it hurteth and diminiſheth the part that quickneth. Alſo it ſtandeth in argument againſt the Sences, and reproveth them of falſhood, and concludeth contrary to their information. And it may be that the man which hath his digeſtion perfect and his Sences ſound, hath not his wit or reaſon ſound in like caſe. Now, were the Soule but onely one ability, it could not be ſo. But now is the ſame divided manifeſtly into wit or underſtanding, and will; the one ſerving to deviſe, and the other to execute. For we underſtand divers things which wee will not, and wee will divers things which we underſtand not: which contrary operations cannot be attributed both to one power. Nevertheleſſe, the uniting of all theſe powers together is with ſuch diſtinctneſſe, and the diſtinguiſhing of them is with ſuch union, that ordinarily they meet altogether in one ſelf-ſame action, the one of them as readily (by all likelihood) as the other, howbeit that every of them doth his own work ſeverally by himſelfe, and one afore another as in reſpect of their objects.

Thus have we three ſorts of men, according to the three powers or abilities of the inward man. Namely, the earthly man, which like the Plant mindeth nothing but ſleeping and feeding, making all his ſenſes and all his reaſon to ſerve to that purpoſe, as in whom the care of this preſent life onely, hath devoured and ſwallowed up his ſences and underſtanding. The Senſuall man (as S. *Paul* himſelfe termeth him) who is given wholly to theſe ſenſible things *imbacing* and caſting down his reaſon ſo far, as to make it a *bond-ſlave* to his ſences and the pleaſures and delights thereof: And the *reaſonable* man, *who liveth properly in ſpirit and minde*, who *entereth into himſelfe to know himſelfe, and goeth out of himſelfe to behold God*; making this life to ſerve to the attainment of a bet-

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ter, and uſing his Sences but as inſtruments and ſervants of his reaſon. After as any of theſe three powers doe reigne and beare ſway in man, that is to wit, after as a man yeeldeth himſelfe more to one than to another of them; ſo becommeth he like unto the Spirits, the brute Beaſts, or Plants, yea and the very Blocks and Stones. But it is our diſpoſition even by kind, to be carried away by our corrupt nature, and by the obiects which hemme us in on all ſides; but as for againſt our nature yea or beyond our nature, our nature is not able to do any thing at all.

Now, it is not enough for us to know that wee have a ſoule whereby wee live, feele, and underſtand, and which being but one hath in it ſelfe alone ſo many ſundry powers or abilities: for it will be demanded of us by and by what this ſoule properly is. And ſoothly if I ſhould ſay, I cannot tell what it is, I ſhould not belye my ſelfe a whit; for I ſhould but confeſſe mine own ignorance, as many great learned men have done afore me. And I ſhould doe no wrong at all to the Soule it ſelf; for ſith we cannot deny the effects thereof, the leſſe that wee be able to declare the nature and being thereof, the more doth the excellency thereof ſhine forth. Againe, it is a plaine caſe, that no thing can comprehend the thing that is greater than it ſelfe. *Now, our Soule is after a ſort leſſe than it ſelfe, in as much as it is wrapped up in this body, in likewiſe as the man that hath gyves and fetters on his feet, is after a ſort weaker than himſelfe.* Nevertheleſſe, let us aſſay to ſatisfie ſuch demands as well as wee can. And for as much as it is the Image of God, not only in reſpect of the government and mayntenance of the whole World, but alſo even in the very nature thereof: as we ſaid heretofore when we ſpake of the nature of God, if we cannot expreſſe or conceive what it is, let us at leaſt wiſe be certified what it is not.

The body and the ſoul be not one ſelf-ſame thing.

First of all, that the Soule and the Body bee not both one thing, but two very far differing things, and alſo that the ſoule is no part of the body, it appeareth of it ſelfe without further proof. For if the ſoule were the body, or a part of the body, it ſhould grow with the body, as the other parts of the body doe, and the greater that the body were, the greater alſo ſhould the ſoule be. Nay, contrary wiſe, the body increaſeth to a certain age and then ſtayeth; after which age is commonly the time that the Soule doth *moſt grow*, and thoſe that are *ſtrongeſt* of minde are commonly *weakeſt* of body, and the Soule is ſeen to be full of livelineſſe in a languiſh-

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ing body, and to grow the more in force, by the decay of the bodie. The Soule then groweth not with the body, and therefore it is not the body, nor any part of the body. And whereas I speak of growing in the soule, by growing I mean the profiting thereof in power and vertue, as the body groweth in greatnesse by further inlarging. Again, if the Soule were the body it should lose her strength and soundnesse with the body so as the maimed in body should therewith feele also a mayme in his understanding, as well as in his members: whosoever were sick of any disease should also be sick in his reason; he that limpeth or halteth, should therewith *halt* in soule also: the blinde mans soule should bee *blinde*, and the lame mans soule should be *lame*. But we see contrariwise, that the maymed and the sick, the cripples and the blinde have their soules whole and sound, and their understanding perfect and cleer-sighted in it selfe. To be short, many a man dyeth whose body is sound, and differeth not a whit in any part from that it was when it was alive, and yet notwithstanding, both life, moving, sense, and understanding are out of it. *Let us say then that in the body there was a thing which was not of the body, but was a far other thing than the body.*

Some wilfull person will object here, that the force and strength of the soule groweth with the body, as appeareth in this that a man grown will remove that which a child cannot, and that a child of two years old will goe, which thing a babe of two moneths old cannot doe. But he should consider also, that if the selfesame man or the selfesame child should have a mischance in his leg or in his arme, he should thereby forgoe the strength and moving thereof, whereas yet notwithstanding his soule should have her former force and power still to move the other as shee did afore. Therefore it is to be said, not that the childs soul is grown or strengthened by time: but rather that his sinews are dryed and hardened which the soule useth as strings and instruments to move withall: and therefore when age hath loosened and weakned them, a man hath need of a staffe to help them with, although he have as good a will to runne as he had when he was young. The soule then which moveth them all at one beck, hath the selfesame power in infancie which it hath in age, and the same in age which it hath in the prime of youth: and the fault is only in the instrument, which is unable to execute the operations thereof: like as the *cunning of a Lute player*

is not diminiſhed by the moiſtneſſe or ſlackneſſe of the Luteſtrings, nor increaſed by the over high ſtraining and tight ſtanding of them; but indeed in the one he cannot ſhew his cunning at all, and in the other he may ſhew it more or leſſe. Likewiſe the ſpeech of children commeth with their teeth, howbeit that the ſpeech doe manifeſtly utter it ſelfe firſt, in that they prattle many things which they cannot pronounce: and in old men it goeth away again with their teeth, and yet their eloquence is not abated thereby. As for *Demoſthenes*, although hee ſurmounted all the Orators of his time, yet were there ſome letters which he could not pronounce. Give unto old age or unto infancie the ſame ſinews and teeth, and as able and luſty limbs and members as youth hath; and the actions which the ſoule doth with the body and by the body, I meane ſo farre forth as concerne the abilities of ſence and liveliynes, ſhall be performed as well in one age as in another. But haddeſt thou as great indifferencie in iudging of the force and power of thyne owne ſoule, as of the cunning of a Lute-player, (I ſay not by the nimblenes of his fingers which are perchance knotted with the geut, but by the playne and *ſweet Harmonie of his Tabulatorie* as they terme it, which maketh thee to deeme him to have cunning in his head, although hee can no more utter it with his hands,) ſo as thou wouldeſt conſider how thou haſt in thy ſelfe a deſire to go, though thy feet be not able to beare thee; a diſcretion to iudge of things that are ſpoken; though thyne eyes cannot convey it unto thee; a ſound eloquence, though for vvant of thy teech thou cannot vvell expreſſe it; and vvhich is above all the reſt, a ſubſtantiall quicke and heavenly reaſon, even vvhen thy body is moſt earthly and drooping. Thou vvouldeſt ſoone conclude that the force and power of quickning, moving, and perceiving, is vvhole and ſound in thy ſoule, and that the default is altogether in thy body. Inſomuch that if ſhe had a nevv body and nevv inſtruments given unto her, ſhe vvould be as luſty and cheerely as ever ſhe vvas, and that the more ſhe perceiveth the body to decay, the more ſhe laboureth to *retire into her ſelf*, vvhich is a plaine proofe of that ſhe is not the body nor any part of the body, but the very life and *in vvorker* of the body.

That the Soul is a ſubſtance.

And ith it is ſo, there needeth no long ſcanning vvhether the ſoul be a ſubſtance or a qualitie. For, ſeeing that qualities have no being but in another thing than themſelves; the life vvhich cauſeth

ſeth another thing to be, cannot be a qualitie. Foraſmuch then as the Soul maketh a man to be a man; who otherwiſe ſhould be but a carcaſſe or carion: doubtleſſe (unleſſe we will ſay that the onely difference which is betwixt a man and a dead carcaſſe, is but in accidents) we muſt needs grant that the ſoule is a forming ſubſtance and a ſubſtantiall forme, yea and a moſt excellent ſubſtance infinitely paſſing the outward man, as which by the power and vertue thereof cauſeth another thing to have being, and perfecteth the bodily ſubſtance which ſeemeth outwardly to have ſo many perfections.

But hereupon inſueth another controverſie, whether this ſubſtance be a bodily or an unbodily ſubſtance: which cauſe requireth ſomewhat longer examination. Soothly, if we conſider the nature of a body, it hath certain meaſurings, and comprehendeth not any thing which is not proportioned according to the greatneſſe and capacity thereof. For, like as it ſelfe muſt be fain to have a place in another thing; ſo muſt other things occupie ſome certain place in it, by reaſon whereof it commeth to paſſe, that things can have no place therein if they be greater then it, without annoying the one the other. To be ſhort, if the thing be leſſe than the body that containeth it, the whole body ſhall not contain it, but onely ſome part thereof: And if it be greater, then muſt ſome part thereof needs be out of it: for there is no meaſuring of bodies but by quantity. Now we ſee how our ſoule *comprehendeth* heaven and earth, without annoying either other; and likewiſe, time paſt, preſent, and to come, without *troubling* one annother; and finally innumerable places, perſons and towns, without *cumbering* of our underſtanding. The great things are there in their full greatneſſe, and the ſmall things in their *uttermoſt ſmallneſſe*, both of them whole and ſound, in the ſoule whole and ſound, and not by piecemeale or onely but in part of it. Moreover, the fuller it is, the more it is able to receive, the more things that are couched in it, the more it ſtill coveteth; and the *greater* the things be, the fitter is ſhee to receive them even when they be at the greateſt. It followeth therefore that the ſoule (which after a ſort is infinite) cannot be a body. And ſo much the leſſe can it ſo be, for that whereas it harboreth ſo *many* and ſo *great* things in it, it ſelfe is lodged in ſo ſmall a body. Again, as a thouſand divers places are in the ſoule or minde without occupying any place; ſo is the minde in a thouſand places without *changing* of place; and that erewhiles not by ſucceſſion of time, nor by turns,

Boddieſſe

but oftentimes altogether at one *inſtant. Bid thy Soule or Mind goe to* Conſtantinople, *and forthwith to turne backe againe to* Rome, *and ſtraight way to be at* Paris or Lyons: *Bid it paſſe thorow* Amercia, *or to goe about* Affricke; *and it diſpatcheth all theſe iourneys at a trice: looke whether ſoever thou directeſt it, there it is; and or ever thou calleſt it backe, it is at home again.* Now, is there a body that can be in divers places at once, or that can paſſe without removing, or that can move otherwiſe than in time, yea and in ſuch time as (within a little under or over) is proportioned both to his pace, and to the lenght of the way which it hath to goe: Then is it certain that our Soule is not a bodily ſubſtance; which thing appeareth ſo much the more plainly, in that being lodged in this body which is ſo movable, it removeth not with the body. Alſo it is a ſure ground, that two bodies connot mutually enter either into other, nor conteine either other: but the greater muſt alway needes conteine, and the leſſer muſt needes be conteined. But by our Soules, we enter, not only either into others bodies, but alſo either into others *minds*, ſo as we comprehend either other by mutuall underſtanding, and imbrace either other by mutuall loving. It followeth then that this ſubſtance which is able to receive a bodileſſe thing, can be no body; and that ſo much the rather, for that the body which ſeemeth to hold it, conteineth it not. Nay verily, this Soule of ours is ſo farre off from being a bodily ſubſtance, and is ſo manifeſtly a Spirit; that to lodge all things in it ſelfe, it maketh them all after a ſort ſpirituall, and bereveth them of their bodies; and if there were any bodylineſſe in it, it were unable to enter into the knowledge of a bodie. So in a Glaſſe a thouſand ſhapes are ſeene: but if the *cleere* of the Glaſſe had any peculiar ſhape of it owne, the Glaſſe could yeeld none of thoſe ſhapes at all. Alſo all viſible things are imprinted in the eye; but if the ſight of the eye had any *peculiar colour* of it owne, it would be a blemiſh to the ſight, ſo as it ſhould either not ſee at all, or elſe all things ſhould ſeeme like to that blemiſh. Likewiſe, whereas the Tongue is the diſcerner of all taſts; if it be not cleere but cumbered with humours, all things are of taſte like to the humour, ſo as if it be bitter, they alſo be bitter; & if it be wateriſh, they be wateriſh to; yea and if it be bitter, it can not judge of bitternes it ſelf. That a thing may receive all ſhapes all colours, and all taſts; it behoveth the ſame to be cleere from all ſhapes, from all colour, and from all favour of it own. And that a

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thing may in understanding know and conceive all bodies, as our soule doth, it behoveth the same to be altogether bodilesse it selfe; for had it any bodilinesse at all, it could not receive any body into it. If we look yet more neerly into the nature of a body, we shall finde that no body receiveth into it the substantiall forme of another body, without losing or altering his own, ne passeth from one form into another, without the marring of the first; as is to be seen in wood when it receiveth fire, in seeds when they spring forth into bud, and so in other things. What is to be said then of mans soul, which receiveth and conceiveth the forms and shapes of all things without corrupting his own, and moreover becommeth the perfecter by the more receiving? For the more it receiveth, the more it understandeth; and the more it understandeth, the more perfect it is.

If it be a bodily substance, from whence is it and of what mixture? If it be of the foure Elements, how can they give life, having no life of themselves? Or how can they give understanding, having no sence? If it be of the mixture of them, how may it be said that of divers things which have no being of themselves, should be made a thing that hath being? Or that of divers outsides should be made one body? or of divers bodies, one Soul? or of divers deaths, one life? or of divers darknesses, one light? Nay rather, why say we not that he which beyond nature hath made the mixture of these bodies, hath for the perfecting of our body, breathed a Soul also into the body? To be short, the property of a body is to suffer, and the property of our Soule is to doe. And if the body be not put forth by some other thing than it self, it is a very block; whereas the mind that is in our Soul ceaseth not to stir up and down in it selfe, though it have nothing to move it from without. Therefore it is to be concluded by these reasons and by the like, that our Soul is a bodilesse substance, notwithstanding that it is united to our body.

And hereupon it followeth also, that our Soule is not any materiall thing, for as much as matter receiveth not any forme or shape but according to his owne quantity, and but onely one forme at once, whereas our Soule receiveth all formes without quantity, come there never so many at once or so great. Againe, no matter admitteth two contrary formes at once; but our Soule contrariwise comprehendeth and receiveth them together, as fire and water, heat and cold, white and black; and not only together, but also the better by the matching and laying of them together. To be Vnmaterial

ſhort, ſeeing that the *more wee depart from matter, the more wee underſtand*: ſurely nothing is more contrary to the ſubſtance of our Soule, than is the nature of matter. Furthermore, if this reaſonable ſoule of ours is neither a bodily nor a materiall thing, nor depending upon matter in the beſt actions thereof: then muſt it needs be of it ſelf, and not proceed either from body or from matter. For what doth a body bring forth but a body; and matter but matter; and materiall but materialls: And therefore it is an unmateriall ſubſtance, which hath being of it ſelfe.

The Soul hath being of it ſelf.

But let us ſee whether the ſame be corruptible and mortall or no. Soothly, if *Plutarch* be to be beleeved, it is in vain to diſpute thereof. For he teacheth, that the *doctrine of Gods providence*, and the *immortalitie of our Soules are ſo linked together*, that the one is as an appendant to the other. And in very deed, to what purpoſe were the World created, if there were no body to behold it: Or to what end behold wee the Creator in the world, but to ſerve him: And why ſhould we ſerve him upon *no hope*: And to what purpoſe hath he indewed us with theſe rare gifts of his, which for the moſt part doe but put us to pain and trouble in this life: if we periſh like the brute Beaſt or the Hearbes, which know him not: Howbeit, for the better ſatisfying of the ſilly Soules which go on ſtill like witleſſe Beaſtes, without taking ſo much leyſure in all their life, as once to enter into themſelves; let us indevour here by lively reaſons to paint out unto them againe their true ſhape, which they labour to deface with ſo much filthineſſe. The Soule of man (as I have ſayd afore) is not a body, neyther doth it increaſe or decreaſe with the body: but contrarywiſe the more the body decayeth, the more doth the underſtanding increaſe; and the neerer that the body draweth unto death, the more *freely* doth the mind underſtand; and the more that the body *abateth* in fleſh, the more *workfull* is the mind. And why then ſhould we think, that the thing which becommeth the ſtronger by the weakneſſe of the body, and which is advanced by the decay of the body, ſhould *returne to duſt* with the body: A mans Sences fayle becauſe his eyes fayle, and his eyes fayle becauſe the Spirits of them fayle: but the *blind* mans underſtanding increaſeth, becauſe his eyes are not buſide: and the olde mans reaſon becommeth the more perfect by the loſſe of his ſight. Therefore why ſay we not that the body fayleth the Soul, and not the Soule the body; and *that the Glaſſes are out of the Spectacles*

Plutarch in his Treatiſe why God deferreth the puniſhment of the wicked.

Vncorruptible

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but *the eyſight is ſtill good*: Why ſhould we deeme the Soule to be forgone with the Sences: If the eye be the thing that ſeeth, and the eare the thing that heareth; why doe we not ſee things double, and heare ſounds double, ſeeing we have two eyes and two ears? It is the ſoule then that ſeeth and heareth; and theſe which wee take to be our ſences, are but the inſtruments of our ſences. And if when our eyes be ſhut or picked out, we then behold a *thouſand* things in our minde; yea, and that our underſtanding is then moſt *quick-ſighted*, when the quickeſt of our eyſight is as good as quenched or ſtarke dead: how is it poſſible that the reaſonable ſoule ſhould be tyed and bound to the ſences? What a reaſon is it to ſay that the ſoule dyeth with the ſences, ſeeing that the true ſences doe then grow and increaſe, when the inſtruments of ſenſe doe die? And what a thing were it, to ſay that a beaſt is dead, becauſe he hath loſt his eyes, when we our ſelves ſee, that it liveth after it hath forgone the eyes? Alſo I have proved that the ſoule is neither the body, nor an appertenance of the body. Sith it is ſo, why meaſure we that thing by the body which meaſureth all bodies; or make that to die with the body, whereby the bodies that die, yea many hundred years agoe, doe after a certain manner live ſtill? Or what can hurt that thing, whom nothing hurteth or hindereth in the body? Though a man loſe an arme, yet doth his ſoule abide whole ſtill. Let him forgoe the one halfe of his body, yet is his ſoule as *ſound* as afore: for it is whole in it ſelfe, and whole in every part of it ſelfe, *united* in it ſelfe and in the own ſubſtance, and by the force and power thereof it *ſpreadeth* it ſelfe into all parts of the body. Though the body rot away by piecemeal, yet abideth the Soule all one and undiminiſhed. Let the bloud dreyn out, the moving wax weake, the ſences faile, and the ſtrength periſh; and yet abideth the minde nevertheleſſe ſound and lively even to the end. *Her houſe muſt be pierced through on all ſides, ere ſhee be diſcouraged*; her walls muſt be battered down ere ſhe fall to fleeting; and ſhe never forſaketh her lodging, till no room be left her to lodge in. True it is, that the brute beaſts forgoe both life & action with their bloud. But as for our ſoule (if we conſider the matter well) it is then gathered *home into it ſelfe*, and when our ſences are quenched, then doth it moſt of all labour to *ſurmount it ſelfe*: working as goodly actions at the time that the body is at a point to fail it, yea and often times far *goodlier* alſo, than ever it did during the whole

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life time thereof. As for example, *it taketh order for it ſelfe*, for our houſehold, for the Common-weale, and for a *whole Kingdome*; and that with more uprightneſſe, *godlineſſe*, *wiſdome*; and moderation, than ever it did afore, yea and perchance in a body ſo far ſpent, ſo bare, ſo conſumed, ſo withered without, and ſo putrified within, that whoſoever looks upon him ſees nothing but earth, and yet to *heare him ſpeake* would *raviſh a man up to heaven*, yea, and *above heaven*. Now when a man ſees *ſo lively a ſoule in ſo weake and wretched a body, may he not ſay as is ſaid of the hatching of chickens, that the ſhell is broken, but there commeth forth a chicken.*

Alſo let us ſee what is the ordinary cauſe that things periſh. Fire doth either goe out for want of nouriſhment, or is quenched by his contrary which is water. Water is reſolved into aire by fire, which is his contrary. The cauſe why the Plant dyeth, is extremitie of cold or drought, or unſeaſonable cutting, or violent plucking up. Alſo the living wight dyeth through contrarietie of humours, or for want of food, or by feeding upon ſome thing that is againſt the nature of it, or by outward violence. Of all theſe cauſes, which can we chooſe to have any power againſt our Soule: I ſay againſt the Soule of man, which (notwithſtanding that it be united to matter and to a bodie) is it ſelfe a ſubſtance unbodily, unmateriall, and only conceivable in underſtanding: The contrarietie of things: Nay, what can be contrarie to that which *lodgeth the contraries alike equally in himſelfe*: which underſtandeth the one of them by the other: which coucheth them all under one skill? and (to be ſhort) in whom the *contrarieties themſelves abandon their contrarieties*, ſo as they doe not any more purſue but inſue one another: Fire is hote, and water cold. Our bodies miſlike theſe contraries, and are grieved by them; but our *mind linketh them together without eithet burning or cooling it ſelfe*; and it ſetteth the one of them againſt the other to know them the better. The things which *deſtroy* one another through the whole world, do *mainteine one another in our minds*. Againe, nothing is more contrary to peace then warre is; and yet mans mind can skill to make or mainteine peace in preparing for warre, and to lay earneſtly for warre in ſeeking or inioying of peace. Even death it ſelfe (which diſpatcheth our life) cannot bee contrary to the life of our Soule: *for it ſeeketh life by death, and death by life*. And what can that thing meet withall in the whole world, that may be able to overthrow it, which can *inioyne obe-*

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dience to things moſt contrary? What then Want of food: How can that want food in the world, which can skill to feed on the whole world: Or how ſhould that forſake food, which the *fuller* it is, *ſo much the hungryer it is*; and the more it hath digeſted, the better able it is to digeſt: The bodily wight feedeth upon ſome certain things, but *our mind feedeth upon all things.* Take from it the ſenſible things, and the things of underſtanding abide with it ſtill: bereave it of earthly things, and the *heavenly remayne abundantly.* To be ſhort, abridge it of all worldly things, yea and of the world it ſelfe, and *even then doth it feed at greateſt eaſe, & maketh beſt cheere agreeable to his owne nature.* Alſo the bodily wight filleth it ſelfe to a certain meaſure, and delighteth in ſome certain things. But *what can fill our mind?* Fill it as full as ye can with the knowledge of things, and it is ſtill *eager* and *ſharpe ſet* to receive more. The more it taketh in, the more it ſtill craveth: and yet for all that, it never feeleth any *rawneſſe* or lack of digeſtion. What ſhall I ſay more: *diſcharge our underſtanding from the minding of it ſelfe*, and *then doth it live in him and of him in whom all things doe live.* Againe, fill it with the knowledge of it ſelfe, and then doth it feele it ſelfe moſt *empty*, and ſharpeſt ſet upon deſire of the other. Now then, can that die or decay for want of food, which cannot be glutted with any thing, which is *nouriſhed and maintained with all things*, and *which liveth in very deed upon him by whom all the things which we wonder at here beneath are upheld:*

And what elſe is violence, but a iuſtling of two bodies together: and how can there be any ſuch betweene a bodie & a ſpirituall ſubſtance: yea or of two ſpirits one againſt another, ſeeing that oftentimes when they would deſtroy one another, they uphold one another: And if the Soule *cannot be puſhed at*, neither inwardly nor outwardly: is there any thing in nature that can naturally *hurt it*: No: but it may perchance be weakened by the very *force* of his encounter, as we ſee it doth befall to our ſences. For the more excellent and the more ſenſible the thing is in his kind which the ſence receiveth, ſo much the more alſo is the ſence it ſelfe offended or grieved therewith. As for example, the feeling, by fire; the taſt, by harſhneſſe; the ſmelling, by ſavours; the hearing, by the hideouſneſſe of noyſe, whether it be of Thunderclap or of the falling of a River; and the ſight, by looking upon the Sunne, upon Fire, and upon all things that have a gliſtering brightneſſe. I omit, that in the moſt

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of theſe things, it is not properly the ſenſe it ſelfe, but the outward inſtrument of ſenſe onely that is offended or hurt. But let us ſee if there bee the like in our reaſonable ſoule. Nay, contrariwiſe the *more of underſtanding and excellencie that the thing is, the more doth it refreſh and comfort our minde.* If it be darke ſo as wee underſtand it but by halves, it hurteth us not, but yet doth it not delight us. Nay, as we increaſe in underſtanding it, ſo doth it like us the better, and the *higher* it is, the more doth it *ſtir up the power* of our underſtanding, and (as you would ſay) *reach us the hand* to draw us to the attainment thereof. As for them that are dimſighted, we forbid them to behold the things that are over-bright. But as for them that are of raweſt capacity, wee offer them the things that are moſt underſtandable. When the ſence beginneth to perceive moſt ſharply, then it is fain to give over, as if it felt the very *death of it ſelfe.* Contrariwiſe, when the minde beginneth to underſtand, then is it moſt deſirous to hold on ſtill. And whereof commeth that, but that our ſenſes work by bodily inſtruments, but our *mind worketh by a bodileſſe ſubſtance* which needeth not the help of the body. And ſeeing that the nature, the nouriſhment and the actions of our ſoule, are ſo far differing, both from the nature, nouriſhment and actions of the body, and from all that ever is done or wrought by the body, can there be any thing more childiſh than to deem our ſoul to be mortall by the abating & decaying of our ſences, or by the mortallity of our bodies? Nay contrariwiſe it may be moſt ſoundly and ſubſtantially concluded thereupon that mans ſoule is of its *own nature immortall*, ſeeing that all death as well violent as naturall commeth of the body and by the body.

What is death

Let us ſee further what death or corruption is. It is (ſay they) a ſeparating of the matter from his forme. And foraſmuch as in man the ſoule is conſidered to be the forme, and the body to be as the matter, the ſeparation of the ſoule from the body is commonly called death. Now then, what death can there be of the ſoule, ſith it is unmateriall, as I have ſaid afore, and a forme that abideth of it ſelfe? For (as one ſaith) a man may take away the roundneſſe or ſquareneſſe from a table of copper, becauſe they have no abiding but in the matter: but had they ſuch a round or ſquare form, as might have an abiding without matter or ſtuffe wherein to be, out of doubt, ſuch forme or ſhape ſhould continue for ever. Nay (which more is) how can that be the corrupter of a thing, which is the perfection

fection thereof: The leſſe corſineſſe a man hath, the more hath he of reaſon and underſtanding. *The leſſe our minds be tyed to theſe bodily things the more lively and cheerefull be they.* At a word, the full and perfect life thereof, is the full and utter withdrawing thereof from the bodie and whatſoever the bodie is made of. All theſe things are ſo cleere as they neede no proofe. Now, we know that every thing worketh according to the proper being therof and that the ſame which *perfecteth the operations* of a thing, *perfecteth the being thereof alſo.* It followeth therefore, that ſith the ſeparation of the body from the Soule, and of the forme from the matter, perfecteth the operation or working of the ſoule (as I have ſayd afore) it doth alſo make perfect and ſtrengthen the very being thereof, and therefore cannot in any wiſe corrupt it. And what elſe is dying but to be corrupted? And what els is corrupting but ſuffering: And what els is ſuffering, but receiving: And how can that which receiveth all things without ſuffering, receive corruption by any thing? Fire corrupteth or marreth our bodies, and we ſuffer in receiving it. So doth alſo extreme colde: but if we ſuffered nothing by it, it could not freeſe us. Our ſences likewiſe are marred by the exceſſive force of the things which they light upon. And that is becauſe they receive and perceive the thing that grieveth them, and for that the manner of their behaving of themſelves towards their obiects, is ſubiect to ſuffering. But as for the reaſonable Soule; which receiveth all things after one manner, that is to wit by way of underſtanding, where through it alway worketh & is *never wrought into*, how is it poſſible for it to corrupt or *marre it ſelfe*:

For what is the thing whereat our Soule ſuffereth ought in the ſubſtance thereof, I meane whereby the ſubſtance of our Soule is any whit impaired or hurt by minding or conceiving the ſame in underſtanding: As little doth the fire hurt it as the aire, and the aire as the fire. As little hurt receiveth it by the frozen ice of *Norwey*, as by the ſcorching ſands of *Affricke*. As little alſo doth vice annoy it as vertue. For vice and vertue are ſo farre of from incombering the ſubſtance of the ſoule, that our mind doth never conceive or underſtand them better, than by ſetting them together one againſt another. *That thing therefore which doth no whit appaire it ſelfe, but taketh the ground of perfecting it ſelfe by all things, cannot be marred or hurt by any thing.*

Again, what is death: The *uttermoſt point of moving*, *and the*

uttermoſt bound of this life. For even *in living we dye, and in dying we live*, and there is not that ſtep which we ſet downe in this life, which doth not continually ſtep forward unto death, after the manner of a Diall or a Clock, which mounting up by certain degrees forgoeth his moving in moving from Minute to Minute. *Take away moving from a body, and it doth no more live.* Now let us ſee if the ſoul alſo be carryed with the ſame moving. If it be caryed with the ſame moving, then doth it undoubtedly move therewithall. Nay contrariwiſe, whether the mind reſt or whether it be buzyed about the proper operations thereof, it is not perceived either by any panting of hart, or by any beating of pulſes, or by any breathing of Lungs. It is then as a Ship that carieth us away with it, whether we walke or ſit ſtill; the ſticking faſt whereof or the tying thereof to a poſte, hindereth not our going up and downe in it ſtill. Againe, if the ſoule be ſubiect to the finall corruption of the body, then is it ſubiect to the alterations thereof alſo; and if it be ſubject to the alterations, it is ſubject to time alſo. For alterations or changes, are ſpices, or rather conſequents of moving, and movings are not made but in time. Now man in reſpect of the body hath certain full poynts or ſtops, at the which he receiveth manifeſt changes, and thereafter groweth or decayeth. But commonly where the decay of the body beginneth, there beginneth the chief ſtrength of the mind! Howbeit that in ſome men, not only their chinnes are covered with down, but alſo their beards become gray, whoſe minds for want of exerciſe, ſhew no ſigne at all either of ripeneſſe or growing. Moreover, time (as in reſpect of the body) cannot be called againe, but in *reſpect of the mind it is alwayes preſent.* Yea and *time perfecteth, accompliſheth, and increaſeth our mind*, and after a ſort reneweth and freſheth it from day to day, whereas contrariwiſe it forwereth, waſheth away and quight conſumeth, both it ſelfe, and the body with the life thereof. It followeth then that the reaſonable Soule is not ſubject to time, nor conſequently to any of the changes and corruption that accompanie time. Nay we may ſay thus much more; That *nothing in the whole world is nouriſhed with things better than it ſelfe; neither doth any of them comain greater things than it ſelfe*; But the things that are corruptible do live of corruptible things, and cannot live without corrupting them: as for example, beaſts live by herbs, men by beaſts, and ſo forth. And therefore things which

live by uncorruptible things, and can ſo receive and digeſt them, as to turne them into the nouriſhment of their nature, and yet not corrupt them; are uncorruptible themſelves to. Now the Soule of man, I meane the reaſonable ſoule or mind, conceiveth reaſon and truth, and is fed and ſtrengthened with them. And reaſon and truth are things unchangeable, not ſubiect to time, place or alteration, but ſteady, unchaungeable, and everlaſting. For that twice two be fower, and that there is the ſame reaſon in the proportion of eight unto ſix that is of fower unto three, or that in a Triangle, the three inner angles are equall with the two right angles; and ſuch like; are truths, which neither years, nor thouſands of years can change; as true at this day, as they were when *Euclide* firſt ſpake them. And ſo forth of other things. It followeth then that the *Soule comprehending reaſon and truth, which are things free from corruption, cannot in any wiſe be ſubiect to corruption.*

Again, *Who is he of all men that deſireth not to be immortall? And how could any man deſire it, if he underſtood not what it is? Or how could he be able to underſtand it, unleſſe it were poſſible for him to attain unto it?* Surely none of us coveteth to be beginningleſſe, for none of us is ſo; neither can any of us be ſo. And as we cannot ſo be, ſo alſo can we not comprehend what it is. For who is he that is not at his wits end, but onely to thinke upon eternitie without beginning? On the contrary part there is not *ſo baſe a minde which coveteth not to live for ever*, inſomuch that whereas we looke not for it by nature, we ſeeke to obtain it by skill and pollicie, *ſome by books, ſome by Images*, and ſome by other devices; and even the *groſſeſt ſort can well imagine in themſelves what immortality is, and are able both to conceive it, and to believe it.* Whence comes this, but that our ſoules being created cannot conceive an everlaſtingneſſe without beginning, and yet nevertheleſſe, that *foraſmuch as they be created immortall, they doe well conceive an immortality or everlaſtingneſſe without end?* And *whereto ſerves this univerſall deſire, if it be not naturall?* or how *is it naturall if it be in vain?* and not onely in vain, but alſo to bring us to hell and to torment? Let us wade yet deeper. *Who can diſpute, or once ſo much as doubt whether the ſoule be immortall or no, but he that is capable of Immortality*, And who can *underſtand what difference is betwixt mortall and Immortall, but he that is Immortall?* Man is able to diſcerne the difference be-

tweene that which is reaſon, and that which is not, and thereupon we terme him reaſonable. Whoſoever would hold opinion that a man is not reaſonable, ſhould need none other diſproof than his own diſputing thereof; for he would go about to prove it by reaſon. Man can skill to diſcerne the mortall natures from the immortall, and therefore we may well ſay he is immortall. For he that ſhould diſpute to the contrary, ſhall be driven to bring ſuch reaſons, as ſhall of themſelves make him to prove himſelfe immortall. Thou ſayeſt the ſoule cannot be immortall: and why? Becauſe (ſayſt thou) that to be ſo, it would behove it to worke ſeverally by it ſelfe from the body. When thou thinkeſt that in thy minde, conſider what thy body doth at the ſame time. Nay, yet further, who hath taught thee ſo much of the immortall nature, if thou thy ſelfe be not immortall? *Or what worldly wight can ſay what the inworking of a reaſonable wight is, but the wight which in it ſelfe hath the uſe of reaſon.*

Yet ſayeſt thou ſtill, if the ſoule be immortall, it is free from ſuch and ſuch paſſions. How intereſt thou ſo far into the Nature that is ſo far above thee, if thou thy ſelfe beeſt mortall? All the reaſons which thou alleadgeſt againſt the immortality of the ſoule doe fight directly to the proofe of it. For if thy reaſon mounted no higher than to the things that are mortall, thou ſhouldeſt know neither mortall nor immortall. Now it is not ſome one covetous man above all other, that deſireth immortality, nor ſome one man excelling all others in wiſdome, that comprehendeth it, but *all mankind* without exception. It is not then ſome one ſeverall skill or ſome one naturall property, that maketh ſuch difference between man and man as we ſee to be between many, but rather one ſelfeſame nature common to all men, whereby they be all made to differ from other living wights, which by no deed doe ſhew any deſire to over live themſelves, ne know how to live, and therefore their lives doe vaniſh away with their bloud, and is extinguiſhed with their bodies. If ever thou haſt looked to die, conſider what diſcourſe thou madeſt then in thy minde, thou never couldeſt perſwade thy conſcience, nor make thy reaſon to conceive, that the ſoule ſhould dye with the body; but even in the ſelfeſame time when it diſputeth againſt it ſelfe, it *ſhifteth* it ſelfe I wot not how from all thy concluſions, and faileth to conſider in what ſtate it ſhall be, and where it ſhall become when it is out of the body. The Epicure that hath diſputed of it all his life long, when he commeth to death, bequeatheth

queatheth a yearly penſion for the keeping of a yearly feaſt on the day of his birth. I pray you to what purpoſe ſerve feaſtings for the birth of a *Swine*, ſeeing he eſteemeth himſelfe to be *no better than ſo?* Nay, what elſe is this, than a *crying out of his nature againſt him*, which with one word confuteth all his vain arguments? Another laboureth by all means poſſible, to blot out in himſelfe the opinion of immortallity; and becauſe he hath lived wickedly in this world, he will needs beare himſelfe on hand, that there is no Juſtice in the world to come. But then is the time that his own nature waketh and ſtarteth up, as it were out of the bottome of a water, and at that inſtant painteth againe before his eyes, the ſelfeſame thing which he tooke ſo much pains to deface. And in good ſooth, what a number have we ſeen, which having been deſpiſers of all Religion, have at the hower of death been glad to *vow* their ſoules to any Saint for reliefe; ſo cleere was then the preſence of the life to come before their eyes. I had lever (ſayd *Zeno*) to ſee an Indian *burne himſelfe cheerfully*, than to heare all the Philoſophers of the World diſcourſing of the immortality of the ſoule; and in very deed it is a much ſtronger and better concluded argument. Nay then, let us rather ſay, I had lever ſee an Atheiſt or an Epicure witneſſe the immortallity of the ſoule, and willingly taking an honourable farewell of nature upon a ſcaffold, then to heare all the Doctors of the world diſcourſing of it in their pulpits. For whatſoever the Epicures ſay *there*, they ſpeake it *adviſedly* and (as ye would ſay) freſh and faſting; whereas all that ever they have ſpoken all their life afore, is to be accounted but as the words of *Drunkards*, that is to wit, of men beſotted and falne aſleepe in the delights and pleaſures of this world, where the wine and the exceſſe of meat and the vapors that fumed up of them did ſpeake, and not the *men* themſelves. What ſhall I ſay more? I have told you already, that in the inward man there are (as ye would ſay) three men, the living, the ſenſitive, and the reaſonable. Let us ſay therefore that in the ſame perſon there are three lives continued from one to another: namely, the life of the Plant the life of the Beaſt, and the life of the Man or of the Soule. So long as a man is in his mothers womb, he doth not onely live and grow; his ſpirit ſeemeth to ſleep, and his ſences ſeem to be in a *ſlumber*, ſo as he ſeemeth to be nothing elſe then a plant. Nevertheleſſe, if ye conſider his eyes, his ears, his tongue, his ſences, and his movings, you will eaſily

Clevi. *lib.* 1.

Three lives in man.

easily judg that he is not made to be for ever in that *prison*, where he neither seeth nor heareth, nor hath any room to walk in, but rather that he is made to come forth into an opener place, where hee may have what to see and behold, and wherewith to occupy all the powers which we see to be in him. As soon as he is come out, he beginneth to see, to feel, and to move, and by little and little falleth to the perfect using of his limbs, and findeth in this world a peculiar object for every of them, as visible things for the eye, sounds for his hearing, bodily things for his feeling and so forth. But besides al this, we find there a *mind*; which by the eys as by windows beholdeth the world, and yet in all the world finding not any one thing worthy to rest wholly upon, *mounteth up to him that made it*; *which minde like an Empresse lodgeth in the whole world*, and not alonely in this body; which by the sences (and oftentimes also without the sences) *mounteth above the sences, and streyneth it self to go out of it self, as a child doth to get out of his mothers wombe*. And therefore we ought surely to say, *that this Mind or Reason ought not to be ever in prison*. That one day it shall see cleerly, and not by these dimme and cloudy *spectacles*: That it shall come in place where it shall have the true object of understanding: and that hee shall have his life free from these *fetters* and from all the affections of the body. To be short, that as man is prepared in his mothers wombe to be brought forth into the world; so is he also after a sort prepared in this body and in this world, to live in another world. We then understand it, when by nature it behoveth us to depart out of the world. And what child is there which (if nature did not by her cunning drive him out,) would of himself come out of his *Covert*, or that cometh not out as good as forlorn and *half dead*; or that if he had at that time knowledge and speech, would not call that *death*, which we call birth; and that a departure out of life, which we call the entrance into it? As long as we be there, we see nothing though our eys be open. Many also do not so much as stir, except it be at some sodain scaring or some other like chance; and as for those that stir, they know not that they have either sence or moving. Why then should wee thinke it strange, that in this life our understanding seeth so little, that many men doe never mind the immortall nature, untill they be at the last cast, yea, and some thinke not themselves to have any such thing, howbeit that even by so thinking they shew themselves to have part thereof? And imagine wee that the *unborn babe* hath not as much adoe

by

by nature to leave the poore skin that hee is *wrapt* in, as wee have hinderance in our ſences and in our impriſoned reaſon, when wee be at the point to leave the goods and pleaſures of this world, and the very fleſh it ſelf which holdeth us as in a grave? Or had the babe ſome little knowledge; would he not ſay that no life were *comparable* to the life where he then is, as we ſay there is no life to the life of this world wherein we be? Or would he not account the ſtage of our ſences for a fable, as a great ſort of us account the ſtage that is prepared for our Souls? Yes ſurely: and therefore let us conclude where wee began, namely that man is both inward and outward. In the outward man, which is the body, he reſembleth the being and the proportion of all the parts of the world. And in the inner man he reſembleth whatſoever kinde of life is in all things, or in any thing that beareth life in the world. In his mothers womb he liveth the life of a plant, howbeit with this further, that he hath a certain *commencement* of ſenſe and moving which exceed the Plant, and doe put him in a readineſſe to be indowed with Sences as a Beaſt is. In this life he hath Senſe and moving in their perfection, which is the property of a ſenſitive wight; but yet beſides theſe, he hath alſo a beginning to reaſon and underſtand, which are a beginning of another life, ſuch as the ſenſitive wight hath not, and this life is to be perfected in another place. In the life to come he hath his actions free and full perfected, a large ground to worke upon, able to ſuffice him to the full, and a light to his underſtanding in ſtead of a light to the eye. And *like as in comming into the world, he came as it were out of another world; ſo in going yet into another world, he muſt alſo goe out of this world.* He commeth out of the firſt world into the ſecond, as it were fayling in nouriſhment, but growing in ſtrength unto moving and ſenſe: and he goeth out of the ſecond into the third, failing in ſences and moving, but growing in reaſon and underſtanding. *Now ſeeing we call the paſſage out of the firſt world into the ſecond a birth, what reaſon is it that we ſhould call the paſſage out of the ſecond into the third a death?* To be ſhort, he that conſidereth how all the actions of mans mind tend to the time to come, without poſſibility of ſtaying upon the preſent time, how pleaſant and delightfull ſoever it be: we may wel diſcerne by them all, that his being (which in every thing (as ſayth *Ariſtotle*) followeth the working thereof) is alſo *wholy bent towards the time to come*; as who would ſay this preſent life were

unto

unto it but as a narrow grindle, on the further ſide whereof (as it were on the bank of ſome ſtreame or running water,) he were to finde his *true dwelling place and very home in deed.*

Objections. But now is it time to ſee what is ſayd to the contrarie: wherein we have to conſider eſtſoons that which we ſpake of afore; namely that *if all that ever is in us were tranſitorie and mortall, wee ſhould not be ſo witty to examine the Immortallitie as we be:* for of contraries the skill is all one. If a man were not mortall, that is to ſay, if he had no life, he could not diſpute of the mortall life; neither could he ſpeake of the immortall, if he himſelfe alſo were not immortall. Therefore let us goe back retrive. Some man will ſay, that the ſoule dyeth with the body, becauſe the ſoule and the body are but one thing, and he believeth that they be both but one, becauſe he ſeeth no more but the body. This argument is all one with theirs, which denyed that there is any God, becauſe they ſaw him not. But yet by his doings thou maiſt perceive that there is a God: *diſcerne likewiſe by the doeings of thy ſoule, that thou haſt a ſoule.* For in a dead body thou ſeeſt the ſame parts remain, but thou ſeeſt not the ſame doings that were in it afore. When a man is dead, his eye ſeeth nothing at all, and yet is there nothing changed of his eye: but while he is alive he ſeeth infinite things that are divers. The power then which ſeeth is not of the body. Yet notwithſtanding, how lively and quick-ſighted ſoever the eye be; it ſeeth not it ſelfe. Wonder not therefore though thou have a ſoule, and that the ſame ſoule ſee not it ſelfe. For if thine eyſight ſaw it ſelfe, it were not a power or ability of ſeeing, but a viſible thing: likewiſe, if thy ſoule ſaw it ſelfe, it were no more a Soule, that is to ſay the worker and quickner of the body, but a very body, unable to doe any thing of it ſelfe, and a maſſie ſubſtance ſubject to ſuffering. For we ſee nothing but the body and bodily ſubſtances. But in this thou perceiveſt ſomwhat elſe than a body (as I have ſaid afore) that if thine eye had any peculiar colour of it own, it could not diſcerne any other colour than that. Seeing then that thou conceiveſt ſo many divers bodies at once in imagination: needs muſt thou have a power in thee which is not a body. Be it (ſay they) that we have a power of ſenſe; yet have we not a power of reaſon; for that which we call the power of reaſon or underſtanding, is nothing but an excellencie or rather a conſequence of ſence, inſomuch that when ſenſe dyeth, the reſidue dyeth therewith

with alſo. Soothly in this which thou haſt ſaid, thou haſt ſurmounted ſence; which thing thou haddeſt not done, if thou haddeſt nothing in thee beyond ſence. For whereas thou ſayeſt, if the ſence dye, the reſt dyeth alſo; it is a reaſon that proceedeth from one terme to another, and it is a gathering of reaſons which conclude one thing by another. Now the ſences do in deed perceive their objects, but yet how lively ſo ever they be, they reaſon not. Wee ſee a Smoake; ſo farre extendeth the ſence. But if we inferre, therefore there muſt needs be fire, and thereupon ſeeke who was the kindler thereof: that ſurmounteth the ability of ſence. Wee heare a piece of Muſicke; that may any beaſt do as well as we. But his hearing of it is but as of a bare ſound; whereas our hearing thereof is as of an harmony, and we diſcern the cauſe of the concords and diſcords, which eyther delight or offend our ſence. The thing that heareth the ſound is the ſence; but the thing that judgeth of that which the ſence conceiveth, is another thing than the ſence. The like is to be ſaid of Smelling, Taſting, and Feeling. Our ſmelling offents, our taſting of ſavours, and our feeling of ſubſtances, is in deed the work of our ſences. But as for our judging of the inward vertue of the thing by the outward ſent thereof, or of the wholſomneſſe or unwholſomneſſe of food by the taſte thereof, or of the hotneſſe or vehemency of a Fever by feeling the Pulſe; yea and our proceeding even into the very bowels of a man, whether the eye being the quickeſt of all ſences is not able to attain; ſurely it is the worke of a more mighty power than the Sence is. And in very deed there are Beaſts which do heare, ſee, ſmell, taſte, and feel much better and quicklier than man doth. Yet notwithſtanding none of them conferreth the contraries of colours, ſounds, ſents and ſavours, none ſorteth them out to the ſerving one of another, or to the ſerving of themſelves. Whereby it appeareth, that man excelleth the beaſts by another power than the ſences, and that whereas *a man is a Painter, a Muſician, or a Phiſician, he hath it from elſewhere then from his ſences.* Nay, I ſay farther, that oftentimes wee conclude clean contrary to the report of our ſences. One eye perchance telleth us that a Tower which we ſee afar off is round, whereas our reaſon deemeth it to be ſquare: or that a thing is ſmall, which our reaſon telleth us is great: or that the ends of lines in a long walke doe meet in a point, whereas our reaſon certifieth us that they run right forth with equall diſtance one from another. For want of

this diſcretion, certaine Elephants (ſayth *Vitellio*) which were paſſing over a long bridge, turned back being deceived; and yet they wanted not ſight no more then we doe. But they that lead them were not deceived. Their leaders then beſides their eyſight, had in them annother vertue or power which corrected their ſight, and therefore ought to be of higher eſtimation. In like caſe is it with the reſt of the other ſences. For our hearing telleth us, that the thunder-clap is after the lightning; but skill aſſureth us that they be both together, for there is a certain power in us, which can skill to diſcerne what proportion is between hearing and ſeeing. Alſo the tongue of him that hath an ague, beareth him on hand that even *ſugar is bitter*, which thing he knoweth by his reaſon to be untrue. To be ſhort, thoſe which have their ſences moſt quick and lively, be not of the greateſt wiſdome and underſtanding. A man therefore differeth from a beaſt, and excelleth man by ſome other power than ſence. For whereas it is commonly ſayd, that ſuch as have ſeen moſt are commonly of greateſt skill, we ſee that many have travailed far both by Sea and land, which have come home as wiſe as they went forth. A horſe hath as good eyes as he that rides upon him, and yet for all his travailing, neither he, nor peradventure his rider whom he beareth become any whit the wiſer by that which they have ſeene: whereby it appeareth that it is not enough to ſee things unleſſe a man doe alſo minde them to his benefit.

Now there is great difference between the livelyneſſe of the Sence, and the power that governeth the Senſe; like as the report of a Spie is one thing, and the Spie himſelfe is another, and the wiſdome of the Captain that receiveth the report of the Spie is a third. Nay, who can deny, that ſenſe and reaſon are divers things; or rather: who will not grant, that in many things they be clean contrary? Senſe biddeth us ſhun and eſchew griefe; whereas reaſon willeth us to proffer our leg ſometime to the Surgeon to be cut off. Senſe plucketh our hand out of the fire, and yet we our ſelves put fire to our bare skin. Hee that ſhould ſee a *Scevola* burn off his own hand, without ſo much as once gnaſhing his teeth at it, would think he were utterly ſenſeleſſe: ſo mightily doth reaſon over-rule ſenſe. To be ſhort, Senſe hath his peculiar inclination, which is appetite, and reaſon likewiſe hath his, which is will. And like as reaſon doth often times over rule ſenſe, and is contrary to it, ſo will correcteth the ſenſuall appetite or luſt that is in us, and warreth

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againſt it. For in an Ague we covet to drinke, and in an Apoplexie we covet to ſleepe, and in hunger we covet to eate, and yet from all thoſe things doth our will reſtrain us. The more a man followeth his luſt, the leſſe is he led by will: and the more he ſtandeth upon the pleaſing of his ſences, the leſſe reaſon uſeth he ordinarily.

Again, let us conſider the brute beaſts which have the ſenſitive part as well as we. If we have no more than that, how commeth it to paſſe that a little child driveth whole flocks and heards of them whether he liſteth, and ſomtimes whether they would not? Whereof commeth it that every of them in their kind, doe all live, neſtle, and ſing after one ſort, whereas men have their Laws, Commonweales, manners of building, and formes of reaſoning, not onely divers, but alſo commonly contrary? Now what can harbour theſe contrarieties together, but onely that which hath not any thing contrary unto it, and wherein all contrary things, doe lay away their contrariety? Surely it is not the ſenſe that can doe it, whoſe proper or peculiar object is moſt contrary to the ſenſe. Beſides this (as I have ſaid afore) whereas we conceive wiſdome, skill, vertue, and ſuch other things which are all bodileſſe, our ſences have none other thing to work upon, than the qualities of bodily ſubſtances. And whereas we make univerſall rules of particular things, the ſences attain no farther than to the particular things themſelves. And whereas we conclude of the cauſes by their effects, our ſences perceive no more but the bare effects: And whereas concerning the things that belong to underſtanding, the more underſtandable they be, the more they refreſh us; contrariwiſe, the ſtronger that the ſenſible things are, the more doe they offend the ſenſe: To be ſhort, the ſelfeſame thing which we ſpeak in behalfe of the ſences, proceedeth from elſewhere than from the Sences. And we will eaſily diſcerne, that he which denyeth that beſides the common ſence, there is in man a reaſon or underſtanding, diſtinct and ſevered from the ſenſe, is voyd both of underſtanding and of ſence.

But ſee here a groſſe reaſon of theirs. This reaſon or power of underſtanding (ſay they) which is in man, is corruptible as well as the power of perceiving by the Sences. I think I have proved the contrary already, nevertheleſſe, let us examine their reaſons yet further. The forme or ſhape of every thing (ſay they) doth periſh with the matter. Now the ſoule is as you would ſay the forme or ſhape of the body therefore it corrupteth with the body. This argument

gument were rightly concluded, if it were meant of the materiall forme. But I have proved that the ſoule is unmateriall, and hath a cõtinuance of it ſelf. And indeed the more it is diſcharged of matter, the more it retaineth his own peculiar forme. Therfore the corruption of the matter toucheth not the ſoule at all. Again, if mens ſouls live (ſay they) after their bodies, then are they infinite, for the world is without beginning & without ending, and (as we know) nature can away with no infinite thing: therefore they live not after their bodies. Yes, ſay I, for I have proved that the world hath a beginning, and that with ſo ſubſtantial reaſons, as thou art not able to diſprove. Therfore it followeth that the inconvenience which thou alledgeſt can have no place. Another ſayth, If dead mens ſouls live ſtil, why come they not to tell us ſo? And he thinketh he hath ſtumbled upon a wonderfull ſubtle device. But how doth this follow in reaſon? There hath not come any man unto us from the Indies a long time: *ergo* there be no Indies. May not the ſame argument ſerve as well to prove that we our ſelves are not, becauſe we never went thither? Again, what intercourſe is there between things that have bodies, and things that have no bodies, or between heaven and earth, conſidering that there is ſo ſmal intercourſe even between men which live under one ſelfeſame Sun? He that is made a Magiſtrate in his own Countrey, doth not willingly return to the place of his baniſhment. Likewiſe the *Soule that is lodged in the Lap of his God, and come home into his native ſoyle, forgoeth the deſire of theſe lower things, which to his ſight beholding them from above, and leſſe then the point of a needle.* On the other ſide, he that is put in cloſe priſon, (how deſirous ſoever he be) cannot goe out; ſo the ſoule which is in the *Jayle of his ſoveraign Lord God, hath no reſpit or ſporting time to come tell us what is done there.* Unto the one, the beholding of the everlaſting God is as a *Paradice* wherein he is willing to remain; and unto the other his own condemnation is an impriſonment of his will. But we would have God to ſend both the one & the other unto us to make us to believe. *As who would ſay, it ſtood him greatlyon hand to have us to believe, and not rather us that we ſhould believe.* And in effect what elſe is all this, but a deſiring that ſome man might return into his mothers womb again, to *incourage young babes againſt the pinches and pains* which they abide in their birth, wherof they would be as ſhie as we be of death, if they had the like knowledge of them? But let us let ſuch vanities paſſe, and come to the ground.

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Yee beare us on hand (say they) that the soul of man is but one, though it have divers powers. Whereof we see the sensitive, and the growing powers to be corrupted and to perish: therefore it should seeme that the understanding or reasonable power also should doe the like. At a word, this is all one as if a man should say, you tell mee that this man, is both a good man, a good Sword-player, and a good luteplayer altogether, and that because his sword falls out of his hand, or his hand it selfe becommeth lame, therefore he cannot be a good or honest man still as you reported him to be. Nay though he lose those instruments, yet ceaseth he not therefore to be an honest man, yea, and both a Sword-player, and a Lute-player too, as in respect of skill. Likewise when our soules have forgone these exercises, yet cease they not to be the same they were afore. To inlighten this point yet more; of the powers of our Soule, some are exercised by the instruments of the body, and othersome vvithout any help or furtherance of the body at all. Those vvhich are exercised by the body, are the sences and the powers of the sences, and the powers of the grovving, vvhich may carrie the same likenesse that is between a Luter and a Lute. Breake the Luters Lute, and his cunning remaineth still, but his putting of it in practice faileth. Give him another Lute and hee falls to playing new again. Put out a mans eye, and yet the ability of seeing abideth still with him, though the very act of seeing be disappointed. But give unto the oldest Hag that is, the same eyes that he had when he was young, and he shall see as well as ever he did. After the same manner is it with the growing or thriving power. Restore unto it a good stomack, a sound liver, and a perfect heart; and it shall execute his functions as well as ever it did afore, The power that worketh of it selfe and without the body, is the power of reason or understanding, which if we will we may call the mind. And if thou yet still doubt thereof, consider when thou mindest a thing earnestly what thy body furthereth thy minde therein, & thou shalt perceive that the more fixedly thou thinkest upon it, the lesse thou seest the things before thee, and *the more thy minde wandereth the more thy body resteth:* as who would say that the workings of the body, are the greatest hinderance and impediment that can bee to the peculiar *doings of the minde.* And this ability of understanding may be likened to a man, which though he have lost both his hand and his lute; ceaseth not therefore to bee a man still, and to

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doe the true deeds of a man, that is to wit, to diſcourſe of things, to minde them, to uſe reaſon and ſuch like; yea, and to be both a Luter and a man as he was afore, notwithſtanding that he cannot put his Lute-playing in exerciſe for want of inſtruments. Nay, (which more is) this underſtanding part groweth ſo much the ſtronger and greater, as it is leſſe occupied and buſied about theſe baſe and corruptible things, and is *altogether drawn home wholy to it ſelfe*, as is to be ſeen in thoſe which want their eyes, whoſe mindes are commonly moſt apt to underſtand, and moſt firme to remember. Doe we debate of a thing in our ſelves? Neither our body nor our ſences are buſied about it. Doe we will the ſame? As little doe they ſtir for that too. To underſtand and to will (which are the operations of the minde,) the ſoule hath no need of the body, and as for working and being, they accompany one another ſayth *Ariſtotle*. Therefore to continue ſtill in being, the ſoule hath not to doe with the body, nor any need of the body: but rather to worke well and to be well, the ſoule ought either to be without the body, or at leaſtwiſe to be utterly unſubject to the body.

Yea (ſay they) but yet we ſee men forgoe their reaſon, as fools and melancholie perſons: & ſeeing it is forgon, it may alſo be corrupted; and if corrupted, it may alſo die; for what is death but an utter and full corruptneſſe? Nay, thou ſhouldeſt ſay rather; I have ſeen divers, which having ſeemed to have loſt their right wits, have recovered them again by good diet and medicinable drinks. But had they been utterly loſt and forgone, no phyſick could have reſtored them again: and had they been utterly periſhed, the parties themſelves ſhould have had neither ſenſe nor life remaining. Therefore of neceſſity the ſoule of them was as ſound as afore. But our ſoules we ſee not otherwiſe than by the body and by the inſtruments of the bodie as it were by Spectacles, and our minde which beholdeth and ſeeth through his imaginations as it were through a cloude, is after a ſort troubled by the dimming of the ſpectacles, and by the ſmoakineſſe of the imaginations. After that manner the Sun ſeemeth to be dimmed & eclipſed; & that is but by the coming of the moon or of ſome clouds between him & us, for in his light there is no abatement at all. Likewiſe our eyſight conceiveth things according to the ſpectacles wherethough it looketh or according to the colour that overthwarteth the things which it looketh upon. Take away the impediments, and our eyes ſhall ſee cleere, purge away the humors,

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and our imagination ſhall be pure: and ſo our underſtand ſhall ſee as bright as it did afore, even as the Sunne ſhineth after the putting away of the Clowdes. And it fareth not with our Soules as it doth with our bodies, which after a long ſickneſſe retain ſtill either a hardneſſe of the Splene, or a ſhortneſſe of breath, or a falling of the Rhewme upon the Lungs, or a skarre of ſome great wound that cannot be worne out becauſe of the breake that was made in the whole. For neither in their underſtanding, neither in their willes do our Soules feele any abatement, ſaving that there abideth ſome maime or blemiſh in the inſtruments; to wit (as I will declare hereafter) ſo farre forth as it pleaſeth GOD for a iuſt puniſhment, to put the Soule in ſubjection to the bodie whoſe ſovereign it was created to have been, becauſe it hath neglected the will of the Creator, to follow the luſts and likings of the bodie. This appeareth in Lunaticke folkes and ſuch others, which have their witts troubled at times and by fitts. For they be not vexed but at the ſtirring of their humours, being at other times ſober and well enough ſtayed in their witts, The like is ſeene in them that have the falling ſickneſſe. For their underſtanding ſeemeth to be eclipſed, and as it were ſtricken with a Thunderclap, during the time of their fitts; but afterward they be as diſcreet as though they ailed nothing. To be ſhort, the body is ſubject to a thouſand diſeaſes, wherewith we ſee the underſtanding to be no whit altered, becauſe they touch not the inſtruments of the Sence and of the Imaginations, which move the underſtanding. Troubled it is in deede by thoſe few things only, which infect the Sence and the Imagination, which by that meanes report the things unfaithfully *whereon the mind debateth.* Therefore ye ſhall never ſee any bodie out of his witts or out of his right mind, in whom the Phiſitions may not manifeſtly perceive, either ſome default of the inſtruments, as a miſhapen and miſportioned head; or els an overabounding of ſome melancholike humour, that troubled and marred his bodie afore it troubled or impaired his mind. And like as the wiſeſt men being deceived by *falſe Spies*, do make wrong *deliberations*, howbeit yet grounded upon good reaſon, which thing they could not doe unleſſe they were wiſe in deede: So the reaſon that is in our mind maketh *falſe diſcourſes*, and gathereth wrorg concluſions, upon the falſe reports of the imagination; which it could not doe, if it were either diminiſhed or impaired, or done away

way. Whereunto accordeth this ancient saying, *That there be certain follyes which none but wise men can commit, and certain Errours which none but learned men can fall into*: becauſe that in ſome caſes, diſcretion and wiſedom are requiſite in the partie that is to be deceived, even to the intent he may be deceived; and learning is required in a man that he may conceive and hold a wrong opinion. As for example, to beguiled by a doubledealing Spy or by the ſurpriſing of a coſening letter, belongeth to none but to a wiſe man. For a groſſheaded foole never breaketh his brain about ſuch matters as might bring him to the making of falſe concluſions by miſtaking likelyhoods in ſtead of truth. Likewiſe to fall into Hereſie by miſconceiving ſome high and deepe point, befalleth not to an ignorant perſon; for he is not of capacitie, neither doth his underſtanding *mount ſo high*. To be ſhort, *Whoſoever ſayth that mans Soul periſheth with the body, becauſe it is troubled by the diſtemperature or miſproportionateneſſe of the body; may as well uphold that the Child in the mothers wombe dyeth with his mother, becauſe he moveth with her, and is partaker with her of her harms and throws, by reaſon of the ſtreit conjunction that is between them; howbeit that many children have lived ſafe and ſownd, notwithſtanding that their mothers have dyed; yea and ſome have come into the World even by the death of their mothers.*

And whereas ſome ſay, that becauſe our mind conceiveth not any thing here, but by helpe of Imagination; therefore when the Imagination is gone with the inſtruments whereunto it is tyed, the Soule cannot work alone by it ſelfe, nor conſequently be alone by it ſelfe: ſurely it is alone as if they ſhould ſay, that becauſe the Child being in his mothers wombe taketh nouriſhment of her bloud by his navill; therefore he cannot live when he is come out her womb, if his navillſtrings be cut off. Nay contrariwiſe, then is the time that the mouth, the tongue, and the other parts of the Childe doe their dutie, which ſerved erſt to no purpoſe, ſaying that they were prepared for the time to come. *After the ſame manner alſo doe wee cheriſh our mind by Imagination in this ſecond life; which in the third life being (as ye would ſay) ſcaped out of priſon, ſhall begin to utter his operations by himſelfe, and that ſo much the more certainly, for that it ſhall not be ſubject to falſe reports, nor to the ſences either inward or outward, but to the very things themſelves which it ſhall have ſeen and learned.* To be ſhort, *it ſhall live, but not in priſon; it ſhall*

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ſee but not through ſpectacles; it ſhall underſtand, but not by reports; it ſhall liſt, but not by way of luſting: the infirmity which the body caſteth upon it as now, ſhal then be away: the force which it bringeth now to the body, ſhall then be more freſh and lively than afore. Now then notwithſtanding theſe vain reaſons of theirs, let us conclude, That our ſonle is an underſtanding or reaſonable power; over the which neither death nor corruption have naturally any power, although it be fitted to the body to govern it. And if any man doubt hereof, let him but examine himſelfe, for even his own doubts will prove it unto him. Or if he will ſtand in contention ſtill, let him fall to reaſoning with himſelfe: for by *concluding his arguments to prove his ſonle mortall, he ſhall give judgement himſelfe that it is immortall.* And if I have left any thing unalleadged which might make to this purpoſe, (for why may I not, ſeeing that even the ſelfeſame things which I have been able to alleadge on the behalfe of mine adverſaries, doe drive them thereunto?) let us think alſo that he which feeleth himſelfe convicted in himſelfe, and for whoſe behoof and benefit it were greatly, both to believe it and to confeſſe it, needeth no more diligent proof than hath been made already. But if any man will yet of ſpight ſtand wilfully ſtill againſt himſelfe, let him try how he can make anſwer to my foreſaid arguments: and in the mean while let us ſee what the ſaid opinion of the wiſeſt men, yea, and of the whole world hath been upon this matter.

Chap. II.

That the immortality of the Soul hath been taught by the Phyloſophers of old time, and believed by all people and Nations.

SOothly it had been a very hard caſe, if this minde of ours which ſearcheth ſo many things in nature, had not taken ſome *leaſure to ſearch it ſelfe* and the nature thereof, and by ſearching attained to ſome poynt in that behalfe. And therefore as there have at all times beene men, ſo ſhall wee ſee alſo that men have at all times believed and admitted the immortality of the ſoule, I ſay not ſome one man, or ſome one Nation, but the whole world with generall conſent, becauſe all men univerſally and particularly have learned it in one ſchoole, and at the mouth of one Teacher, namely even their own knowledge in themſelves. The holy Scripture which

teacheth us our ſalvation, uſeth no ſchool arguments to make us believe that there is a God: and that is becauſe we cannot ſtep out of our ſelves never ſo little, but we muſt needs finde him preſent to all our ſences. And it ſeemeth to ſpeake unto us the leſſe expreſſely of the immortality of our ſoules, ſpecially in the firſt books thereof, becauſe we cannot *enter into our ſelvs* be it never ſo little, but we muſt needs perceive it. But in as much as from the one end thereof to the other, it declareth unto us the will of God: in ſo doing, it doth us to underſtand, that it is a thing, *whereof it is not lawfull for us to doubt.*

The opinion of the Men of old time.

And whereas it ſetteth forth ſo preciſely from age to age, the great and manifold troubles and pains which good and godly men have ſuffered in indeavouring to follow that will, it ſheweth infalibly that their ſo doing was in *another reſpect* than for this preſent wretched life. For who is he that would depart with any piece of his own liking in this life, but in *hope* of better things? and what were it for him to loſe his life, if there were not *another life* after this? This ſerveth to anſwer in one word to ſuch as demand expreſſe texts of Scripture, and are *loth to finde* that *thing in the Bible, which is contained there*, not onely in every leaf, but almoſt in every line. For whereas God created man after the world was fully finiſhed & perfected: it was as much as if he had brought him into a Theater prepared for him, howbeit after another ſort than all the other living things which were to doe him ſervice. As for beaſts, birds, plants, and ſuch other things, the elements brought them forth, but man received his ſoule by *inſpiration* from God. Alſo the brute beaſts are put in ſubjection to man, but man is *in ſubjection onely unto God.* And the conveying of that good man *Henocke* out of this life for his godlineſſe, was to none other end, but *to ſet him in another life void of all evill, and full of all good.*

The belief of the Patriarks, &c.

But when we read the perſecutions of *Noe*, the overthwartings of *Abraham*, the baniſhment and wayfarings of *Jacob*, and the diſtreſſes of *Joſeph*, *Moſes*, and all the reſidew of the Fathers; they be all of them *demonſtrations*, that they did *certainly truſt and believe* that the *ſoule is immortall*, that there is another life after this, and that there is a judgement to come. For had they been of opinion that there is none other life after this; the *fleſh* would have perſwaded them to have held themſelves in quiet here, and they would have liked nothing better than to have followed *ſweetly* the cõmon trade of the world, *Noe* among his friends, *Abraham* among the *Chaldees*, *Moſes* in *Pharoahs* Court, and

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so foorth. So then, although the Scripture seeme to conceale it; yet doth it speake very loude thereof in deede, considering that all the *cryes* of the good and godly, and all the *despayres* of the wicked which it describeth unto us, doe sound none other thing unto us, if we have eares to heare it. And it may be, that in the same respect, this article of the Immortalitie of the Soule was not put into the ancient Creede of the *Jews*, nor also peculiarly into the Creede of us Christians, because we *beleeve beyond reason*, and this is *within the bounds of reason*; and whosoever treateth of *Religion must needes presuppose God eternall and man immortall, without the which two, all Religion were in vayne*. Also, when we see that *Godlinesse*, *Iustice*, and *vertue* were *commended* among the *Heathen* of all ages: it is *all one as if we should heare them preach in* expresse words the *Immortalitie of the Soule*. For their so doing is builded every whit upon that, as upon a foundation without the which those things could not stand. I will spend my goodes or my life for the maintenance of Iustice. What is this Iustice but a vaine name, or to what end have I so many respects, if I looke for nothing out of this present world here: I will (sayd a man of olde time) *rather lose even the reputation of an honest man, than behave myselfe otherwise than honestly*. But why should I doe so, if I looke for no good in another world, seeing I have nothing but evill here: Surely if there be none other thing than this life, then is vertue to be used no further, than profit and commoditie may growe upon it; and so should it become a *Chaffer and Merchandise*, and not *vertue* in deed. Yet notwithstanding, those are the ordinary speeches, even of such as speake doutfully of the Immortalitie of the Soule. Therefore they doe but denye the ground and yet grant the consequence; which is all one as if a man having first bin *burned* should fall to disputing whether fire be *hot* or no. But now (which is better for us) I will here gather together their owne speeches one after another.

The wise Men of Egypt.

Hermes declareth in his *Pœmander*, how at the voyce of the everlasting, the Elements yeelded forth all reasonlesse living wights as it had bin out of their *bosomes*. But when he commeth to man, he sayth, He made him like unto himselfe, he linked himselfe to him as to his Sonne, (for he was beautifull and made after his owne Image) and gave him all his works to use at his pleasure. Againe, he exhorteth him to forsake his bodie, (notwithstanding that he wonder greatly at the cunning workmanship thereof) as

Hermes in his *Pœmander*, ἀπεκύησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ θεὸς αὐτῷ ἴσον οὐ ἠράθη ὡς ἰδίου τόκου.

the very cauſe of his death, and to manure his ſoul which is capable of immortality, and to conſider the originall root from whence it ſprang, which is not earthly but heavenly, and to withdraw himſelfe even from his ſences, and from their *trayterous alluerements* to *gather himſelfe wholy into that minde of his* which hee hath from God, and by the which, he following Gods word, may become as God. *Diſcharge thy ſelfe* (ſayth he) *of this body which thou beareſt about thee, for it is but a cloke of ignorance, a foundation of infection, a place of corruption, a living death, a ſenſible carryon, a portable grave, & a houſehold thief. It flattereth thee becauſe it hateth thee, and it hateth thee becauſe it envieth thee. As long as that liveth it bereaveth thee of life, & thou haſt not a greater enemie than that.* Now, to what purpoſe were it for him to forſake this light, this dwelling place, & this life, if he were not ſure of a better in another world (as he himſelfe ſayth more largely afterward.) On the other ſide, what is the ſoule?) The ſoule (ſayth he) is the garment of the minde, and the garment of the ſoule is a certain ſpirit, whereby it is united to the body. And this minde is the thing which we call properly the man, that is to ſay, a heavenly wight which is not to be compared with beaſts, but rather with the Gods of heaven, if he be not yet more than they. The heavenly cannot come down to the earth without leaving the heaven, but man meaſureth the heaven without removing from the earth. The earthly man then is as a mortall God, and the heavenly God is as an immortal man. To be ſhort, his concluſion is, That man is double, mortall as touching his body, and immortall as touching his ſoule, which ſoule, *is the ſubſtantiall man, and the very man created immediately of God* (ſayth he) *as the light is bred immediately of the Sunne.* And *Chalcidius* ſayth, that at his death he ſpake theſe words. I goe home again into mine own countrey, where my better forefathers and kinſfolke be.

Hermes in his *Pœmander, cap.* 10.

ὁ ἀνθρωπος.

Hermes in his *Eſculapius.* *AEneas Gaz.* concerning the immortality of the Soule. *Chaldeans.*

Of *Zoroaſtres* who is yet of more antiquity than *Hermes*, we have nothing but fragments. Nevertheleſſe, many report this argument to be one of his, That mens ſouls are immortall, and that one day there ſhall be a generall riſing again of their bodies; and the anſwers of the wiſe men of *Chaldye* (who are the heirs of his Doctrine) doe anſwer ſufficiently for him. There is one that exhorteth men to return with ſpeed to their heavenly father, who hath *ſent them from above, a ſoule endowed with much underſtanding*, and another that exhorteth them to ſeeke paradice, as the peculiar dwelling

ling place of the ſoule. A third ſayth that the ſoule of man *hath God as it were ſhut up in it*, and that it hath not any mortality therein. For (ſayth he) the ſoule is as it were *drunken with God*, and ſheweth forth his wonders in the harmonie of this mortall body. And again, another ſayth, It is *a cleere fire proceeding from the power of the heavenly father*, an uncorruptible ſubſtance, and the maintainer of life, containing almoſt all the whole world with the full plenty thereof in his boſom. But one of them proceedeth yet further, affirming that he which ſeteth his minde upon godlineſſe, ſhall *ſave his body*, fraile though it be. And by thoſe words he acknowledgeth the very *glorifying of the body*.

Now, all theſe ſayings are reported by the *Platonists*, and namely by *Pſellus*; and they refuſe not to be acknowne that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* learned them of the *Chaldees*; inſomuch that ſome think, that the foreſaid *Hermes* and *Zoroaſtres*, and the reſidue afore-mentioned, are the ſame of whom *Plato* ſpeaketh in his ſecond Epiſtle, and in his eleventh Book of Laws, when he ſayth that the *ancient and holy Oracles* are to be believed, which affirme mens Souls to be Immortall, and that in another life they muſt come before a *Judge* that will require an account of all their doings: The effect whereof commeth to this, That the Soule of man proceedeth immediatly from God, that is to ſay, that the father of the body is one, and the Father of the Soul is another: That the Soul is not a bodily ſubſtance, but a Spirit and a Light: That at the departure thereof from hence, it is to go into a Paradiſe, and therefore ought to make haſte unto death: And that it is ſo far from mortality, that it maketh even the body Immortall. What can we ſay more at this day, even in the time of light wherein we be? *Pherecydes* the *Syrian*, the firſt that was known among the *Greeks* to have written proſe, taught the ſame. And that which *Virgill* ſayth in his ſecond Eglog concerning the Drug or Spice of *Aſſyria*, and the growing thereof every where is interpreted of ſome men to be ment of the Immortalitie of the Soule, the doctrine whereof *Pherecydes* brought from thence into *Greece*; namely, that it ſhould be underſtood everywhere throughout the whole world. Alſo *Phocylides* who was at the ſame time, ſpeaketh thereof in theſe words,

The *Greeks*.

Pherecydes.

Aſſyrium vulgo naſcetur *Amomum*.

Phocylides.

ψυχὴ δ' ἀθάνατος ἐ ἀγήρως ἔν διὰ παντός. That is to ſay:

The Soul of man immortall is, and never weares away
With any age or length of time, but liveth freſh for aye.

And again:

Δείψανα ἀποιχομένων ὀπίσω θεοὶ τελέθονται,
ψυχαὶ γὰρ μίμνουσιν ἀκηρεοι εν φθιμένοισιν.
The Remnants which remayn of men unburied in the grave,
Become as Gods, and in the Heavens a life most blessed have.
For though their bodies turn to dust, as daily we do see,
Their Souls live still for evermore from all corruption free.

And in another place he says again:

Καὶ τάχα δ' ἐκ γαίης ἐλπίζομεν ἐς φάος ἐλθεῖν.
We hope that we shall come agayn
Out of the earth to light more playn.

And if ye aske him the cause of all this: he will answer you in another verse thus.

Πυεῦμα γὰρ εστὶ θεοῦ χρῆσις θνητοῖοι καὶ ἐκών.
Because the Soul, Gods Instrument and Image also is.

Sybill. Which saying he seemeth to have taken out of this verse of *Sibils*.

Εἰκών εστὶ ἀνθρωπος ἐμὴ λόγου ὄρθου εἰχρῆτα.
In very reason Man should be
The Image and the shape of me.

Pindar in the second song of his *Olympiads*. *Homer* in the Funerals of his *Iliads*.

Of the same opinion also are *Orpheus*, *Theognis*, *Homer*, *Hesiodus*, *Pindar*, and all the Poets of old time; which may answer both for themselves and their owne Countries, and for the residue of their ages. Likewise *Pythagoras* a disciple of *Pherecides*, held opinion that the Soule is a bodylesse and immortall substance, put into this body as into a *Prison for sinning*. And whereas the *fleeting* of soules out of one body into another, is fathered upon him; although the opinion be not directly against the immortality of the soul, yet doe many men thinke that he hath wrong done unto him. And his Disciple *Timæus* of *Locres* reporteth otherwise of him. For what punishment were it to a voluptuous man; to have his Soule put into a beast, that he might become the more voluptuous without remorse of sinne? Soothly it is all one as if in punishment of murther or theft, yee would make the murtherer to cut the throats of his own father and mother, or the thiefe to commit treachery against God. Howsoever the case stand, he teacheth in his verses, that man is, of *heavenly race*, and that (as *Jamblichus* reporteth) he is *set in this world to behold God*. And his Disciple *Architas* sayth, that God breatheth reason and understanding into him. Likewise *Philolaus* affirmeth that the Divines and Prophets

Pythagoras.

of

of old time bear record, that the ſoule was coupled with the body for her ſins, and buried in the ſame as in a grave. Of *Epicharmus* we have this ſayling. *If thou beeſt a good man in thy heart; death can doe thee no harme, for thy ſoule ſhall live happily in heaven, &c.* Alſo of *Heraclides* we have this ſaying, *We live the death of them* (that is to ſay of the bleſſed) his meaning is that we be not buried with our bodies, *and we dye their life*, that is to ſay, we be ſtill after this bodie of ours is dead. Of the like opinion are *Thales*, *Anaxagoras*, and *Diogenes* concerning this point; yea and ſo is *Zeno* too, howbeit that he thought the ſoule to be begotten of man, wherein he was contrary to himſelfe. To be ſhort, ſcarcely were there any to be found among the men of old time, ſave onely *Democritus* and *Epicurus* that held the contrary way; whom the Poet *Lucre* imitated afterward in his Verſes. Yet notwithſtanding when *Epicurus* ſhould dye, he commanded an Anniverſary or *Yeerminde* to be kept in remembrance of him by his Diſciples: ſo greatly delighted he in a vain ſhadow of immortality, having ſhaken off the very thing it ſelfe. And *Lucrece* (as it is written of him) made his book being mad, at ſuch times; as the fits of his madneſſe were off him, ſurely more mad when hee thought himſelfe wiſeſt, than when the fits of his phrenſie were ſtrongeſt upon him. Whoſoever readeth the goodly diſcourſes of *Socrates* upon his *drinking of poyſon*, as they be reported by *Plato* and *Xenophon* himſelfe; cannot doubt of his opinion in this caſe. For he not onely believed it himſelf, but alſo perſwaded many men to it with lively reaſons, yea and *by his own death* much more then by all his life. And ſo yee ſee we be come unto *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, with conſent of all the wiſe men of old time, ungainſaid of any, ſaving of a two or three malapart wretches, whom the ungraciouſneſſe of our dayes would eſteem but as drunken ſots and diſards. Certeſſe *Plato* (who might peradventure have heard ſpeake of the Books of *Moſes*) doth in his *Timæus* bring in God giving commandement to the *under-gods* whom he created, that they ſhould make man both of mortall and of immortall ſubſtances. Wherein it may be that he alluded to this ſaying in Geneſis, *Let us make man after our own image and likeneſſe*. In which caſe the Jews ſay that GOD directed his ſpeech to his Angels; but our Divines ſay he ſpake to himſelfe. But anon after, both in the ſame book, and in many other places, *Plato* (as it were commming to himſelfe again,) teacheth that

Heraclitus as he is reported by *Philo*.

Epicharmus as he is reported by *Clement* of *Alexandria*.

Thales, *Anaxagoras*, *Diogenes* and *Zeno*.

Epicurus.

Lucretius.

Socrates, *Plato* and *Xenophon*.

Plato in his *Timæus*.

GOD

Plato in his *Timæus*, and in his third Booke of a Commonweal.

GOD created Man by himselfe, yea, and even his Liver and his Brain and all his Sences; that is to say, the Soule of him, not onely endued with reason and understanding, but also with sence and ability of growing and increasing; and also the instruments whereby the same doe worke. Moreover, he maketh such a manifest difference betweene the Soule and the Body; as that he matcheth them not together as matter and forme, as *Aristotle* doth: *but as a Pilot and a Ship, a Common-weale and a Magistrate, an Image and him that beareth it upon him.* What greater thing can there be than to be like God? Now (sayth *Plato* in his *Phœdon*) *The Soul of Man is very like the Godhead; Immortall, Reasonable, Uniforme, Undissoluble, and evermore of one sort, which are conditions* (sayth he, in his matters of State) *that cannot agree but to things most divine.* And therefore at his departing out of the World, *hee willed his Soul to retnrn home too her kinred and to her first originall,* that is to wit, (as he himself sayth there) *to the wise and Immortall Godhead the Fountain of all goodnes, as called home from banishment into her own native Country.* Hee termeth it ordinarily ξυγγενῆ θεοῦ, that is to say, *of Kyn unto God*, and consequently ἀειγενῆ καὶ ἀθανάτοις ὁμονυμοις, that is to say, *Everlasting, and of one self-same name with the immortall ones, a Heavenly Plant* and not a Earthly, *rooted in* & *Heaven* not in *Earth*, begotten from above and not heer beneath, and finally such as cannot dye heer for as much as it liveth still in another place. To be short, seeing (sayth he) that it *comprehendeth the things that are Divine and Immortall*, that is to wit, the *Godhead*, and the things that are unchangeable and uncorruptible, as truth is: it cannot be accounted to be of any other nature than they. The same opinion doth *Plutarch* also attribute unto him, which appeareth almost in every leafe of his Writings. As touching the ancienter sort of *Platonists*, they agree all with one accord in the Immortality of the Soul, saving that some of them derive it from God, and some from the Soule of the World, some make but the Reason or Mind onely to be Immortall, and some the whole Soule: which disagreement may well be salved, if we say that the Soul all whole together is Immortall in power or ability, though the execution and performance of the actions which are to be done by the body, be forgone with the instruments or members of the body.

Plato in his *Phœdon*, in his matter of State, in his *Alcibiades*, and in the tenth Book of his Commonweal.

Plato in his fifth Book of Laws.

The disagreement concerning this point among such as a man may vouchsafe to call by the name of Phylosophers, seemeth to have be-

begun at *Ariſtotle*, howbeit that his Diſciples count it a commendation to him, that he hath given occaſion to doubt of his opinion in that behalfe. For it is certain that his new found Doctrine of the eternity or everlaſtingneſſe of the world, hath diſtroubled his brain in many other things, as commonly it falleth out, that one error breedeth many other. *Becauſe nature* (ſayth he) *could not make every man particularly to continue for ever by himſelfe, therefore ſhee continueth him in the kinde by matching male and female together.* This is ſpoken either groſely or doubtfully. But whereas he ſayth that if the minde have any inworking of it own without any help of the Sences or of the body, it may alſo continue of it ſelfe, concluding thereupon, that then it may alſo be ſeparated from the body, as an immortall thing from a thing that is tranſitory and mortall: It followeth conſequently alſo, that the ſoule may have continuance of it ſelfe, as whereof he uttereth theſe words, namely, That the ſoule commeth from without, and not of the ſeed of man, as the body doth, and that the Soule is the onely part in us that is Divine. Now, to bee Divine and to be Humane, to be of ſeed and to be from without, that is to ſay, from GOD; are things flat contrary, whereof the one ſort is ſubject to corruption, and the other not. In the tenth book of his Moralls he acknowledgeth two ſorts of life in man; the one as in reſpect that he is compoſed of body and ſoule, the other as in reſpect of minde onely, the one occupied in the powers which are called humane and bodily, which is alſo accompanied with a felicity in this life, and the other occupied in the vertues of the minde, which is accompanied alſo with a felicity in another life, This which conſiſteth in *contemplation*, is better than the other; and the felicity thereto belonging, is peculiarly deſcribed by him in his books of *Heaven above Time*, as which conſiſteth in the franke and free working of the minde, and in beholding the *ſoverain God*. And in good ſooth, fulwell doth *Michael* of *Epheſus* upon this ſaying of his conclude, that the ſoule is immortall; and ſo muſt all his moralls alſo needs doe, conſidering that to live well, whether it be to a mans ſelfe or towards other men, were elſe a vain thing and to no purpoſe, but to vex our mindes in this life. In his books of the ſoule, hee not onely ſeparateth the body from the ſoule, but alſo putteth a difference betwixt the ſoule it ſelfe and the mind,

Ariſtotl in his ſecond book of living things.

Ariſtotle in the third book of the Soule.

Ariſtotle in his 10. book of Moralls.

Michael of *Epheſus* upon *Ariſtotles* Moralls.

ἄριστος, δεῖται συνεργείαις, δεῖται συμπαραστάσεως, χωριστὸς ἀμιγὴς, ἀπαθὴς τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας.

In his second book of the Soule.

termining the soule the *inworking of the body*, and of the bodily instruments, and the minde that reasonable substance which is in us, whereof the doings have no fellowship with the doings of the body, and whereof the soule is (as *Plato* sayth) but the garment. *This minde* (sayth he) *may be severed from the body, it is not in any wise mingled with it, it is of such substance as cannot be hurt or wrought upon, it hath being and continuance actually and of it selfe, and even when it is separated from the body, then is it immortall and everlasting. To be short, it hath not any thing like unto the body. For it is not any of all those things which have being afore it understand them. And therefore which of all bodily things can it be?* And in another place he sayth thus: *As concerning the minde, and the contemplative power, it is not yet sufficiently apparant what it is, Nevertheless, it seemeth to be another kinde of soule, and it is that onely which can be separated from the corruptible, as the which is Ayeverlasting.* To bee short, when as hee putteth this question, whether a Naturall Philosopher is to dispute of all manner of Soules, or but onely of that Soule which is immortall: it followeth that hee granteth that there is such a one. And again, when as hee maketh this argument, *Looke what God is everlastingly, that are we in possibility, according to our measure; but hee is everlastingly separated from bodily things, therefore the time will come that we shall be so too.* Hee taketh it that there is an image of God in us, yea even of the Divine nature which hath continuance of it selfe. Very well and rightly therefore doth *Simplicius* gather thereof, the immortality of the soule. For it dependeth upon this separation, and upon continuance of being of it selfe. Besides this he sayth also, that hunting of beasts is granted to man by the law of nature, because that thereby man challengeth nothing but that which naturally is his own. But what right I pray you, *if there be no more in himselfe than in them?* And what is there more in him than in them; if they have a soule equall unto his? Hereunto make all his commendations of godlinesse, of Religion, of blessednesse, and of contemplation. For to what end serve all these, which doe but cumber us here below? Therefore surely it is to be concluded, that as he spake doubtfully in some one place, so he both termed and also taught to speake better in many other places, as appeareth by his Disciple *Theophrastus*, who speaketh yet more evidently thereof than he.

In the last book of the parts of beasts.

In the tenth of his Supernaturalls.

In his first book of matters of State.

The

The Latines (as I have ſayd before) fell to Philoſophie ſomewhat later then the Greeks. And as touching their common opinion, the exerciſes of ſuperſtition that were among them, the manner of ſpeeches which we marke in their Hiſtories, their contempt of death, and their hope of another life; can give ne ſufficient warrant thereof, *Cicero* ſpeaketh unto us in theſe words. *The originall of our ſoules and mindes, cannot be found in this low earth, for there is not any mixture in them, or any compounding that may ſeeme to be bred or made of the earth. Neither is there any moiſture, any windineſſe, or any fiery matter in them. For no ſuch thing could have in it the power of memory, underſtanding, and conceit, to beare in minde things paſt to foreſee things to come, and to conſider things preſent, which are matters altogether divine.* And his concluſion is, that therefore they bee derived from the minde of God, that is to ſay, not bred or begotten of man, but created of God: not bodily, but unbodily; whereupon it followeth that the ſoule cannot be corrupted by theſe tranſitory things. The ſame *Cicero* in another place ſayth that between God and man there is a *kinred* of *reaſon*, as there is between man and man a kinred of bloud. That the fellowſhip between man and man commeth of the mortall body, but the *fellowſhip between God and man, commeth of God himſelfe*, who created the ſoule in us. *By reaſon whereof* (ſayth he) *we may ſay we have alyance with the heavenly ſort, as folke that are diſcended of the ſame race and root, whereof that wee may ever more bee mindfull, we muſt looke up to heaven as to the place of our birth, whether we muſt one day returne.* And therefore yet once again he concludeth thus of himſelfe. *Thinke not* (ſayth he) *that thou thy ſelfe art mortall, it is but thy body that is ſo. For thou art not that which this outward ſhape pretendeth to be, the minde of man is the man indeede, and not this lump which may be pointed at with ones finger. Aſſure thy ſelfe therefore that thou art a God; For needs muſt that be a God, which liveth, perceiveth, remembreth, foreſeeth, and finally raineth in thy body as the great God the maker of all things doth in the univerſall world. For as the eternall God ruleth and moveth this tranſitory world, ſo doth the immortall ſpirit of our ſoule move and rule our frail body.* Hereunto conſent all the writers of his time, as *Ovid*, *Virgill* and others, whoſe verſes are in every mans remembrance.

The opinion of the Latine Writers.

Cicero in his firſt book of his Tuſculane Queſtions, and in his book of Comfort.

Cicero in his ſecond book of the nature of the Gods: and in his firſt book of Laws.

In Scipio's dreame.

Ovid in his first book of Metamorphosis.

The ewanted yet the wight that ſhould all other wights exceed
In lofty reach of ſtately minde, who like a Lord indeed
Should over all the res' due reign, Then ſhortly came forth man,
Whom either he that made the World, and all things elſe began.
Created out of ſeed divine, or elſe the earth yet young
And lately parted from the Skie, the ſeede thereof uncloong
Reteyned ſtill in fruitfull wombe: which Japets ſonne did take
And tempering it with water pure, a wight thereof did make,
Which ſhould reſemble even the Gods which ſoverein ſtate doe hold:
And where all other things the ground with groveling eye behold;
He gave to man a ſtately look and full of Majeſty.
Commanding him with ſtedfaſt looke, to face the ſtarry skie,

Seneca writing to *Gallio* and to *Lucillus*.

Here a man might bring in almoſt all *Senecaes* writings, but I will content my ſelfe with a few ſayings of his. *Our Soules* (ſayth he) *are a part of Gods Spirit, and ſparkes of holy things ſhineing upon the earth. They come from another place then this low one. Whereas they ſeeme to be converſant in the bodie, yet is the better part of them in heaven, alway neere unto him which ſent them hither. And how is it poſſible that they ſhould be from beneath, or ſ om any where elſe than from above, ſeeing they overpaſſe all theſe lower things as nothing, and hold ſcorn of all that ever we can hope or feare?* Thus ye ſee how he teacheth that our ſouls come into our bodies from above. But whether go they againe, when they depart hence: Let us here him what he ſayes of the Lady *Martiaes* Sonne that was dead. *He is now everlaſting* (ſayth he) *and in the beſt ſtate, bereft of this earthly baggage which was none of his, and ſet free to himſelfe. For theſe bones, theſe ſinewes, this coate of skin, this face, and theſe ſerviceable hands, are but fetters and priſons of the ſoule. By them the ſoule is overwhelmed, beaten downe, and chaſed away. It hath not a greater battell, than with that maſſe of fleſh. For fear of being torn in peeces, it laboureth to return from whence it came, where it hath readie for it an happie and everlaſting reſt.* And again: *This ſoule cannot be made an Outlaw: for it is akin to the Gods, equall to the whole world, and to all time; and the thought or conceit thereof goeth about the whole Heaven, extending it ſelfe from the beginning of all time to the uttermoſt point of that which is*

Seneca concerning the Lady *Martiaes* Son, and the ſhortneſſe of this life. In his Queſtions and in his book of comfort

to

to come. The wretched course being the fayle and fetters of the soule, is tossed to and fro. Upon that are torments, murthers, and diseases executed. As for the soule, it is holy and everlasting, and cannot be layd hand on. When it is out of this body, it is at libertie and set free from all bondage, and is conversant in that beautifull place (where-soever it be) which receiveth mens soules into the blessed rest thereof as soone as they be delivered from hence. To be short, he seemeth to pricke very nere to the rising againe of the dead. For in a certain Epistle to *Lucillus*, his words are these. *Death, whereof we be so much afraid, doth not bereve us of life, but only discontinew it for a time; and a day will come that shall bring us to light againe.* This may suffice to give us knowledge of the opinion of that great personage in whom we see that the more he grew in age, the nerer he came still to the true birth. For in his lateſt bookes he treateth alwaies both more assuredly and more evidently thereof.

Also the saying of *Phavorinus* is notable. *There is nothing great on earth*, (sayth he) *but Man; and nothing great in Man, but his soule if thou mount up thether, thou mountest above Heaven. And if thou stoope downe againe to the bodie, and compare it with the Heaven; it is lesse than a Fly, or rather a thing of nothing.* At one word, this is as much to say, as that in this *clod of clay* there dwelleth a divine and uncorruptible nature: for how could it els bee greater than the whole world? *Phavorinus.*

As touching the Nations of old time, we reade of them all, that they had certain Religions and divine Services, so as they beleeved that there is a Hell and certain fieldes which they call the *Elysian fields*, as we see in the Poets *Pindarus*, *Diphilus*, *Sophocles*, *Euripides* and others. The more superstitious that they were, the more sufficiently doe they witnesse unto us what was in their Conscience. For true Religion and Superstition have both one ground, namely the soule of man; and there could be no Religion at all, if the soule lived not when it is gone hence. We read of the *Indians*, that they burned themselves afore they came to extreme oldage, terming it the *letting of men loose*, and the freeing of the soule from the bodie: and the *sooner* that a man did it, *the wiser* was he esteemed. Which custome is observed still at this day among the people that dwell by the River *Niger* otherwise called the people of *Senega* in *Affricke*, who offer themselves willingly to be buryed quicke with their Masters. All the demonstrations of The common opinion of all Nations. *Porphyrius*, in his 4 book of Abstinence, Which with their own hands made the fire to burn their bodies in: and saw alive the kindled flame that should consume their skin.

Logicke and Mathematicke (ſayth *Zeno*) have not ſo much force to prove the immortalitie of the ſoule, as this only doing of theirs hath. Alſo great *Alexander* having taken priſoners ten of their Philoſophers, (whom they call *Gimnoſophiſts*) asked of one of them to try their wiſedome, whether there were moe men alive or dead. The Philoſopher anſwered, that there were more alive: *Becauſe* (ſayd he) *there are none dead.* Ye may well think they gave a dry mocke to all the arguments of *Ariſtotle* and *Calliſthenes*, which with all their Philoſophie had taught their ſcholer *Alexander* ſo evill. Of the *Thracians*, we reade that they ſorrowed at the brith of men and *reioyced at the death of* them, yea even of their owne childen. And that was becauſe they thought that which we call death, not to be a death in deede, but rather a very *happie birth.* And theſe be the people whom *Herodotus* reporteth to have been called the *Neverdying Getes*, and whom the *Greekes* called the *Neverdying Getes or Thracians.* Who were of opinion that at their departing out of this world, they went to *Zamolxis or Geliſh* tongue) to *him that gave them health, ſaluation or welfare, and gathered them together.* The like is ſayd of the *Galles*, chiefly of the inhabiters about *Marſilles* and of their *Druydes*; of the *Hetruſcians* and their Biſhops; and of the *Scythians* and their Sages; of whom all the learning and wiſedome was grounded upon this poynt. For looke how men did ſpread abroad, ſo alſo did this doctrine, which is ſo deeply printed in man, that he cannot but carie it continually with him. Which thing is to be ſeene yet more in that which we read concerning the hearers of *Hegeſias* the *Cyrenian*, who dyed willingly after they had heard him diſcourſe of the ſtate of mens ſoules after this life; and likewiſe concerning *Cleombrotus* the *Ambraciot*, who ſlew himſelfe when hee had read a certain treatiſe of the immortalitie of the ſoule. For had it not been a doctrine moſt evident to mans wit, they would never have bin caried ſo farre by it, as to the hurting of their bodies. And if among ſo many people, there be perchance ſome fewe wretched *caytifes*, that have borne themſelves on hand the contrarie; which thing nevertheleſſe they could never yet fully perſwade themſelves to be out of all doubt or queſtion: ſurely we may beleeve that they had very much adoe and were utterly beſotted like Drunkards, afore they could come to that poynt: ſo as we may well ſay of them

Gebeleizie, that is to ſay, Regiſter or giver of *beleizie*, that is to ſay (after the interpretation of the *Getiſh or Go-* eaſe and reſt.

as

as *Hierocle* the *Pythagorist* sayd: namely, *That the wicked would not have their souls to be immortall, to the intent they might not bee punished for their faults. But yet that they prevent the sentence of their Judge, by condemning themselves unto death afore hand.* But if they will neither heare God, nor the whole world, nor themselves: let them at leastwise hearken to the Devill as well as they doe in other things; who (as saith *Plutark*) made this answer to *Corax* of *Naxus* and others in these verses.

Herocles in his 10. Chap.

Plutarke in his treatise of the slow punishing of the wicked.

It were a great wickednesse for thee to say
The Soule to be mortall or for to decay.

And unto *Polytes* he answered thus

As long as the Soule to the body is tyde,
Though loth yet all sorowes it needes must abyde.
But when fro the body Death doth it remove,
To heaven by and by then it flyes up above.
And there ever youthfull in blisse it doth rest,
As God by his wisedome hath set for the best.

Not that any saying of the Devills owne is to be alledged in witnesse of the truth; furtherfoorth than to shew that hee speakes it by compulsion of Gods mightie power, as wicked men divers times doe when they be upon the Racke. Now we be come to the time or nere to the time that the heavenly doctrine of Jesus Christ was spred over the whole world, unto which time I have proved the continuall succession of that doctrine, which could not but be unseparably ioyned with the succession of men. But from this time forth it came so to light among all Nations & all persons; that Saint *Austin* after a short tryumphing over ungodlinesse, cryeth out in divers places, saying: *Who is now so very a foole or so wicked, as to doubt still of the immortalitie of the Soule? Epictetus* a Stoikphilosopher, who was had in very great reputation among all the men of his time, is full of goodly sayings to the same purpose. *May we not be ashamed* (sayth he) *to leade an unhonest life, and to suffer our selves to be vanquished by adversitie? we be alyed unto God, we came from thence, and we have leave to returne thether from whence we came.* One while, as in respect of the soule, he termeth man the *offspring of GOD*, or as it were a branch of the Godhead; and another while he calleth him *a divine Impe or a spark of God:* by all which words (howbeit that they be somewhat unproper) (for what words can a man finde to

The opinion of the later Philosophers.

Epictetus. ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ.

fit

fit that matter:) he ſheweth the uncorruptibleneſſe of the ſubſtance of mans ſoule. And whereas the Philoſopher *Simplicius* hath ſo diligently commented upon his bookes, it doth ſufficiently anſwer for his opinion in that caſe, without expreſſing his words here. *Plotinus* the excellenteſt of all the *Platoniſts*, hath made nine treatiſes expreſſely concerning the nature of the ſoule, beſides the things which he hath written diſperſedly heere and there in other places. His chiefe concluſions are theſe. That mens ſoule proceede not of their bodies, nor of the ſeede of the Parent, but come from above, and are as ye would ſay grafted into our bodies by the hand of God: That the ſoule is partly tyed to the body and to the inſtruments thereof, and partly franke, free, workfull, and continuing of it ſelfe; and yet notwithſtanding that it is neither a body nor the harmonie of the body, but (if we conſider the life and operation which it giveth to the body) it is after a ſort the perfection [or rather the perfector] of the body; & if we have an eye to the underſtanding whereby it guydeth the movings and doings of the body; it is as a Governour of the body: That the further it is withdrawne from the Sences, the better it diſcourſeth of things; inſomuch that when it is utterly ſeparated from them, it underſtandeth things without diſcourſing, reaſoning or debating, yea even in a moment; becauſe this debating is but a certain *lightening or brightneſſe of the minde*, which now taketh adviſement in matter whereof it doubteth, & it doubteth whereſoever the body yeeldeth any impedements unto it; but it ſhall neither doubt nor ſeek adviſement any more when it is once out of the body, but ſhall conceive the truth without wavering: That the ſoule in the body is not properly there as in a place, or as in a ground, becauſe it is not contained or comprehended therein, and may alſo be ſeparated from it; but rather if a man had eyes to ſee it withall, he ſhould ſee that the bodie is in the ſoule, as *an acceſſary is in a principall*, or as a thing contained in a container, or a ſheding or liquid thing in a thing that is not liquid, becauſe the *Soule imbraceth the body*, and quickneth it, and moveth it equally and alike in all parts. That every abilitie thereof is in every part of the bodie, as much in one part as in another, as a whole ſoule in every part; notwithſtanding that every ſeverall abilitie thereof ſeeme to be ſeverally in ſome particular member or part, becauſe the inſtruments thereof are there; as the ſenſitive abilitie ſeemeth to reſt in the head, the irefull in the heart and

Simplicius.

Plotinus.

Plotin. lib. 1. Anead 4. concerning the being of the Soule, *& lib. 2. cap. 1. & lib. 3. cap. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. lib. 4. exp. 11.* and the ſeventh book throughout.

and the quickning in the liver, becauſe the ſinews, heart-ſtrings, and veins come from thoſe parts: Whereas the reaſonable power is not in any part, ſaving ſo far forth as it worketh and hath his operation there, neither hath it any need of place or inſtrument for the executing of it ſelfe. And to be ſhort, that the ſoule is a life by it ſelfe, a life all in one, unpartable, which cauſeth to grow, and groweth not it ſelfe: which goeth through the bodie, and yet is not contained of the body; which uniteth the ſences, and is not divided by the Sences, and therefore that it is a bodileſſe ſubſtance, which cannot be touched, neither from within nor from without, having no need of the body either outwardly or inwardly and conſequently is immortall, divine, yea and *almoſt a very God*: Which things he proveth by many reaſons, which were too long to be rehearſed here. Yea, he proceedeth ſo far as to ſay that they which are paſſed into another world, have their memory ſtill, notwithſtanding that to ſome mens ſeeming, it goe away with the ſences as the treaſury of the ſences. Howbeit he affirmeth it to be the more excellent kinde of memory, not that which calleth things again to minde as already paſt, but that which *holdeth and beholdeth* them ſtill as always preſent. Of which two ſorts this latter he calleth Mindfulneſſe, and the other he calleth Remembrance. I will add but onely one ſentence more of his for a full preſident of his Doctrine. *The ſoule* (ſayth he) *hath had company with the Gods, and is immortall, and ſo would we ſay of it (as* Plato *affirmeth) if we ſaw it faire and cleere. But for as much as we ſee it commonly troubled, we think it not to be either divine or immortall: howbeit that he which will diſcerne the nature of a thing perfectly, muſt conſider it in the very own ſubſtance or being, utterly unmingled with any other thing. For whatſoever elſe is added unto it, doth hinder the perfect diſcerning of the ſame. Therefore let everyman behold himſelfe naked, without any thing ſave himſelfe, ſo as he look upon nothing elſe than his baſe ſoule: and ſurely when he hath viewed himſelfe in his own nature, meerly as in reſpect of his nature, he ſhall believe himſelfe to be immortall. For he ſhall ſee that his nature, (which not properly is the ſenſible and mortall things, but that by a certain everlaſting power, it taketh hold of the things that are everlaſting, and of whatſoever is poſſible to be conceived in underſtanding: inſomuch that even it ſelfe becommeth after a ſort a very world of underſtanding and light.* This is againſt thoſe which pretend a ſenſe-

Plotinus in his Booke of the Sences, and of Memory. *En.* 4. *lib.* 3. and in his Booke of doubts concerning the Soul, *cap.* 26, 27

the ſoule, by reaſon of the inconveniencies which it indureth very often in the body.

Of the ſame opinion are *Numenius*, *Jamblichus*, *Porphirius*, and *Proclus*, notwithſtanding that now and then they paſſe their bounds, ſuffering their wits to run ryot. For in their Philoſophie they had none other rule, than onely the drift of their own reaſon. It was commonly thought that *Alexander* of *Aphrodiſe* believed not the immortality of the ſoule, becauſe hee defined it to be the forme of the body, proceeding of the mixture & temperature of the Elements. Surely theſe words of his doe us to underſtand, either that he meant to define but the ſenſitive life onely (as many others do) and not the reaſonable ſoule, or elſe that he varieth from himſelfe in other places. And in very deed he ſayth immediately afterward, that he ſpeaketh of the things which are ſubject to generation and corruption. But ſpeaking of the ſoule he ſayth it is ſeparable, unmateriall, unmixed, and voyd of paſſions, unleſſe, perchance we may thinke as ſome doe, that by this ſoule hee mean but onely God, and not alſo the ſoule that is in us; for the which thing hee is ſharply rebuked by *Themiſtius*, who notwithſtanding ſpake never a whit better thereof himſelfe. Howſoever he deale elſewhere, theſe words of his following are without any doubtfulneſſe at all. *That the Soule* (ſayth he) *which is in us, commeth from without, and is uncorruptible. I ſay uncorruptible becauſe the nature thereof is ſuch, and it is the very ſame that* Ariſtotle *affirmeth to come from without.* And in his ſecond Booke of Problems, ſearching the cauſe why the abilities of the ſoule are oftentimes impeached: *If a mans brain be hurt* (ſayth he) *the reaſonable ſoule doth not well execute the actions that depend thereon. But yet for all that, It abideth ſtill in it ſelfe, unchangeable of nature, ability, and power, through the immortality thereof. And if it recover a ſound inſtrument, it putteth her abilities in execution as well as it did afore.* But I will reaſon more at large hereafter againſt the opinion that is fathered upon him.

Alexander of *Aphrodiſe* in his Books of the Soul.

In his ſecond Book of Problemes.

What ſhall we ſay of *Galen*, (who fathereth the cauſes of all things as much as he can, upon the Elements, and the mixture and agreeable concord of them) if after his diſputing againſt his own ſoule, hee bee conſtrained to yield that it is immortall? Surely in his book concerning the manners of the ſoule, he doth the worſt

Galen in his Book of the Manners of the Soul.

that

that he can againſt *Plato*: and in another place he doubteth whether it be immortall, and whether it have continuance of it ſelfe or no. Yet notwithſtanding in his book of the doctrine of *Hippocrates* and *Plato*, *It muſt needs be granted* (ſayth he) *that the Soule is either a ſheere body, and of the nature of the skie, (as the Stoicks and* Ariſtotle *himſelfe, are inforced to confeſſe) or elſe a bodileſſe ſubſtance, whereof the body is, as it were, the Chariot, and whereby it hath fellowſhip with other bodies.* And it appeareth that he inclineth to this latter part. For he maketh the vitall ſpirit to be the excellenteſt of all bodily things, and yet he granteth the ſoule to be a far more excellent thing than that. What ſhall we then doe? Let us wey his words ſet down in his book of the conception of a childe in the mothers wombe. *The Soule of man* (ſayth hee) *is an influence of the univerſall Soule that diſcendeth from the heavenly Region, a ſubſtance that is capable of knowledge, which aſpireth always to one ſubſtance like unto it ſelfe, which leaveth all theſe lower things to ſeeke the things that are above, which is partaker of the heavenly Godhead, and which by mounting up to the beholding of things that are above the heavens, putting it ſelfe into the preſence of him that ruleth all things.* Were it reaſon then that ſuch a ſubſtance comming from elſewhere than of the body, and mounting ſo far above the body, ſhould in the end die with the body, becauſe it uſeth the ſervice of the body?

In his Book of the doctrine of *Hippocrates* and *Plato*.

In his Book of Conception.

The univerſall conſent.

Now hereunto I could adde infinite other ſayings of the ancient Authors both *Greeke* and *Latine* Philoſophers, Poets, and Orators from age to age, wherein they treat of the judgement to come, of the reward of good men, of the puniſhment of evill men, of *Paradiſe and of Hell*, which are *appendants* to the *immortality* of the Soule: but as now I will but put the reader in minde of them by the way, reſerving them to their peculiar places. To be ſhort, let us run at this day from Eaſt to Weſt, and from North to South, I ſay not among the *Turks*, *Arabians* or *Perſians*, (for their *Alcoran* teacheth them that mans ſoule was breathed into him of God, and conſequently that it is uncorruptible) but even among the moſt barbarous, ignorant, & beaſtly people of the World, I meane the very *Caribies* and *Canniballs*, and we ſhall finde this beliefe received and imbraced of them all. Which giveth us to underſtand, that it is not a doctrine invented by ſpeculations of ſome

In the Alcoran, Azo. 25. and 42.

It appeareth by the ſtories of the Eaſt & Weſt Indies.

Philosophers, conveyed from Countrey to Countrey by their Disciples, perswaded by likelyhoods of reasons, or (to be short) entered into mans wit by his ears: but a *native knowledge*, which every man *findeth and readeth in himselfe* which he carryeth everywhere about with himselfe and which is as easie to be perswaded unto all such as *view themselves in themselves*, as it is easie to perswade a man that never saw his own face, to believe that he hath a face, by causing him to behold himselfe in a glasse.

Against *Averroes*.

There remain yet two opinions to bee confuted. The one is the opinion of *Averhoes*, and the other is the opinion of *Alexander* of *Aphrodise*, who affirme themselves to hold both of *Aristotle*: namely in that they uphold that there is but one universall reasonable soule or mind, which worketh all our discourses in us, howbeit diversly in every severall person. And this thing (if wee believe *Averrhoes*) is done according to the diversity of the Phantasies or imaginations wherewith the minde is served as with instruments. But if we believe *Alexander*, it is done according to the diversities of the capable minde, as they terme it, that is to say, of the ability or capability that is in men to understand things, by receiving the impression of the universall minde that worketh into every of them which in respect thereof is called of them the *worker*. Soothly these opinions are such as may be disproved in one word. For this onely one minde, whether in possibility or in action, could not have received or imprinted in every man one selfesame common beliefe and conceit of the immortality of the Soule, in so great diversity of imaginations, and in so many Nations, as we see doe believe it, considering that the very same conceit is directly repugnant against it. Nay, it may well be sayd that *Averrhoes* and *Alexander* had very divers conceits and imaginations one from another, and very contrary to all other mens, seeing they had so diverse and contrary opinions imprinted either in their mind or in their imagination. Howbeit for as much as there may be some, that will make a doubt of it; let us examine them severally yet more advisedly. First, *Averrhoes* will needs bear *Aristotle* on hand, that *Aristotle* is of that opinion. Let us see how this surmise of his can agree with the propositions which *Aristotle* hath left us. *Aristotle* telleth us that the soule is knit to the body as the forme or shape to the matter; that the soule hath three chiefe powers, namely, of life, of sense, and of understanding; and that the understanding

Let the Reader bear these terms & their significations in Mind, for all the discourse here ensuing.

Averrhoes upon *Aristotles* third Book of the Soul.

ſtanding part containeth in his power both the other two powers, as a five ſquare containeth both a foreſquare and a Triangle. Whereupon it followeth, that if any one of the three powers of the ſoule be joyned to the body as a forme to the matter; all the three be joyned ſo to, as which are all in one ſoule as in their root. Now *Averrhoes* neither can nor will deny that the powers of growing and of perceiving by the ſences are joyned after that manner to the body; and therefore it followeth that the underſtanding power is ſo joyned alſo, and conſequently that according to *Ariſtotle*, as every body hath his forme, ſo every body hath his ſoule. The ſame *Ariſtotle* findeth fault with the former Philoſophers for holding opinion that a ſoule might paſſe out of one man into another: becauſe (ſayth he) that every certain ſoule muſt needs be apportioned and appointed to ſome one certain body. Now looke by what ſoule a man liveth, by the ſame ſoule doth he underſtand: for it is but one ſoule indewed with three divers abilities, as hee himſelfe teacheth openly. One underſtanding or minde therefore, muſt (according to *Ariſtotle*) worke but in one ſeverall body, and not in many bodies. Alſo according to *Ariſtotle*, a man and a beaſt agree in this, that both of them have one ſenſitive power, and one ſelfeſame imagination of things perceived by the ſences, and that they differ in this, that man hath yet further *a minde and reaſon* above the beaſt, which thing the beaſt hath not. Now if this underſtanding or minde be without the man, as the ſunne is without the chamber, that it ſhineth into and inlighteneth, then cannot he be called reaſonable, or indowed with underſtanding, neither doth he conſequently differ from a beaſt. For the difference muſt be *in nature*, and not in *accident*. And ſo ſhould it inſue that *Ariſtotles* foreſaid definition of a man is falſe, as if he ſhould define a chamber by the ſhining of the ſunne into it: Or ſay that a dog differeth not from a man in kinde; yea, and that beaſts are capable of underſtanding, for as much as they have imagination ready aforehand to receive the influence thereof as well as we. But *Ariſtotle* is always one in his defining both of beaſt and of man; and *Averrhoes* alſo holdeth himſelfe to it, without doubting thereof at all. This concluſion therefore cannot in any wiſe be upheld by ſuch grounds.

Ariſtotle in his ſecond Book of the Soul.

Ariſtotle in his firſt Book of the Soul.

Again, if there be not in every ſeverall man a ſeverall minde, but onely one univerſall minde common to all men, which becommeth divers by the onely diverſity of our imaginations: Then in reſpect

reſpect that we have ſundry imaginations, we ſhall by ſundry living wights; and in reſpect that we have all but one minde, we ſhall be all but one man. For man is not man in reſpect of the ſenſitive power, but in reſpect of the reaſonable part which is the minde. But *Ariſtotle* granteth that we be not onely divers living wights, but alſo divers men. And therefore he muſt needs mean alſo, that wee have not onely divers imaginations, but alſo divers minds. Now beſides many other reaſons that might be aleadged, yee might add this alſo, That otherwiſe *Ariſtotles* Moralls and his diſcourſes concerning Juſtice, Freewill, the Immortality of the ſoule, the happie bliſſe, the reward of the good, and the pains of the wicked, were utterly *fruitleſſe* and to no purpoſe: For as our fancies or imaginations did come and goe, ſo would all thoſe things come and goe likewiſe, and ſo ſhould they have no continuance of themſelves, but onely be as a ſhadow and vain phantaſie. But let *Ariſtotle* alone, (for he hath wrong) and let us come to the matter it ſelfe. The Philoſophers doe ordinarily make a double minde; the one which they call *poſſible or impoſſible*, which is capable and of ability to underſtand things; and this they liken to a *ſmooth table*; the other they call *working or workefull*, which bringeth the ability into act, whereas notwithſtanding they be not two mindes, but two ſeverall abilities of onely one minde. Now, as for this ability or poſſibility of underſtanding, we affirme it to be in the ſoule of every man. Contrariwiſe, *Averrhoes* affirmed onely one univerſall capable minde to be ſhed abroad every where throughout all men; & that the ſame is diverſly perfected and brought into act in every ſeverall man, according to the diverſity of the imaginations which the man conceiveth, even by the help or influence of the ſaid univerſall workfull minde, which he ſayth is alſo a ſubſtance ſevered, from man, and (in reſpect of the underſtanding in poſſibility) is as the ſunne is to the ſight of our eyes, and the underſtanding in poſſibility is to the imaginations as the ſight is unto colours. Now, I demand firſt of all, whether theſe uniuerſall minds of his, bee ſubſtances created or uncreated. If they be created, where becommeth then his concluſion, That the world is without beginning, and without ending, ſeeing that he will have them to be continued everlaſtingly in all men that have been, are, or ſhall be? If they bee uncreated, how can ſo excellent ſubſtances be made ſubject to our fond imaginations, to yield influence into them at their pleaſures?

Or

Or rather how happeneth it that they correct them not? How happeneth it that they leave them in such errors, yea even in the knowledge of themselves, seeing that by the erring of the imaginations, the very understanding and reason themselves must also needs be so often beguiled? Again, as concerning these substances, which extend into so many places; are they Bodies or Spirits? How can they be bodies, seeing they be *in infinite places at one instant*, and *doe infinite things*, yea, and flat contraries? And if they be Spirits, doth it not follow thereupon, that they be wholy in all men & wholy in every man; that is to say, that every man hath them *wholy to himselfe?* And therefore that if they be deceived by the fantasie of any one man, they be consequently deceived in all men? And whereof comes it then, that one man overcommeth his imaginations, and another man not? Or that one man resisteth them, and another suffereth himselfe to be carried away by them? Moreover, who can deny that a man willeth things, whereof he hath understanding, and likewise that he willeth some things which he understandeth not; and that he understandeth some things which he willeth not? And also that he willeth things even contrary to his appetites, and concludeth oftentimes contrary to his imaginations, as commeth to passe in dreams and in looking-glasses; which thing the brute beasts doe not? When a man willeth contrary to his appetites, willeth he not contrary to his sences, yea, and contrary to his imaginations too: for what els is fantasie or imagination, than the *rebounding backe* of the sences: And if this workfull understanding be the only worker in his possible understanding by meane of imagination; how commeth it to passe that a man willeth contrary to his imagination: Againe, when either in dreaming or in debating, reason concludeth cleane contrary to that which fancie or imagination offereth; whereof commeth it that a man is contrary to himself, or that the deede is contrary both to that which *imprinted it*, and to that wherein it is imprinted? Also what els is imagaination (according to the opinion of *Averroes,*) than a certain operation annexed to the bodie, steaming up from the Hart to the Braine: And on the contrary part who can say nay, but that the Will and Understanding are able to performe their operations without the instruments of the body, seeing that a man doth both will and debate things that are most repugnant to the body: Yea and that (as *Aristotle* sayth) those be not actions which passe into the outward

Aristotle in his tenth Book of Supernaturals

man

man, but those which abide within & make perfect the inner man: And who can make Will and Vnderstanding to be things depending upon imagination, seeing that both waking and sleeping and all manner of ways els, they dayly utter infinite iudgements and determinations against it: Now, if we have nothing in us above Imagination: then considering that we doe both will and understand, it must needes be that this power or abilitie to will and understand is *shed into us from without*. And if it but only one universally in all men; then seeing that the actions thereof are executed without the imagination, without the sences, and without the instruments of the bodie, yea and against them: it followeth that it willeth and understandeth in us whatsoever it liketh and listeth, even in *despite* of all impediments and lets of the bodie; and that as it is but one, so it shall will but one selfesame thing, and likewise also understand but one selfesame thing in all men. For if (as *Aristotle* confesseth) our imaginations make not our will and reason subject unto them; much lesse doe they make the foresayd universall mind subject to them as *Averrhoes* pretendeth. But now contrariwise we see therebe as many Willes as men, yea even in one matter; and that the understandings of men are not onely divers, but also contrarie. It followeth then that every particular person hath in that behalfe a particular substance, which willeth and understandeth, franke and free from all imaginations whensoever it listeth to *retyre into it selfe*; and not that there is but one universall mind which willeth and understandeth all things in all men. Besides this, by the iudgement of *Aristotle* as I sayd afore, this universall mind could not worke will and understanding in us: for to will and understand (sayth he) are operations that passe not into the matter nor into the outward thing but abide stil in the worker, that is to say in the mind, as actions and perfections thereof.

Let us yet againe take of that which hath bin sayd afore. If the sayd universall only one working mind, have wrought from everlasting in the sayd universall only one capable mind, by the Imaginations of men: then hath the knowledge of all things bin evermore imprinted in the sayd capable mind; for it shall evermore have brought the abilitie into act: And therwithall the working and perfection of the thing that is everlasting, shall have depended upon a thing that is temporall; which is impossible. And although *Averrhoes* supposed not the World to be everlasting: yet notwithstanding,

ding the ſaid capable minde which hath been ſet aworke ſo many hundred years, by ſo many imaginations of men, and in ſo many ſundry Nations, could not now meet with any new thing whereof it had not the knowledge afore. For this capable mind (ſayth *Averrhoes*) is a certain ſpirituall ſubſtance, which ſpreadeth it ſelfe forth into all men and into all ages, and the natute of ſuch ſort of ſubſtances is to be all in the whole, and all in every part thereof. For they be not tyed to any one place, but are whereſoever they worke, and their working is in reſpect of the whole, and not in reſpect of any one part, foraſmuch as they be undividable. Therefore it ſhould follow by his opinion (as I have ſayd afore) that the one univerſall capable minde is and worketh whole & unparted in every man. And if it be ſo, then is that being of it there, not in way of meer ability or poſſibility onely, but in way of operation and perfect inworking, as a wicked ſpirit is in a witch, in a Pythoneſſe or in a poſſeſſed perſon: which ſpirit (were he poſſeſſed of the man as he himſelfe poſſeſſeth the man, (after which manner *Averrhoes* affirmeth us to poſſeſſe the underſtanding in poſſibility, by our imaginations;) would make the man capable of all that ever the Spirit himſelfe knoweth or is. Whereupon it will follow, that this underſtanding in poſſibility, ſhall everlaſtingly in all men from their very birth, actually underſtand and know all things that all men underſtand, as well in the old as the young, and in the ignorant as the skilfull; ſo as wee ſhall have no more need of ſences; nor of imagination to underſtand withall. To be ſhort, although *Averrhoes*, admitteth not the World to be without beginning: yet at leaſtwiſe he will not deny, but that by his reckoning they which come into the world at this day, ſhould come far more skilfull then all their predeceſſors, and the children of them more skilfull then their fathers, and the offspring of thoſe children more skilfull then thoſe children themſelves, and ſo forth on, becauſe they ſhould ſucceed in the knowledge continued throughout all ages. Whereupon it will alſo inſue, that all Sciences ſhall be equall in all men that make profeſſion of them. As for example, we will ſpeak here, but of ſome one ſpeciall Science, as Grammer and Arithmetick. Now if there be any diverſity in the skill thereof, that diverſity cannot come but of the diverſity of the ſubject or ground wherein the skill is. Now the ground of the skill is the capacity of the minde or underſtanding, (which *Averrhoes* ſuppoſeth to be but on-

ly one, common to all men) and not the Imagination, which is but a reflexion or rebounding backe of the Sence. And ſo foraſmuch as there is (by his ſaying) but one ground in all men; it followeth that the knowledge or skill of this or that Science muſt needes be equall and alike in all men: or els that if it be not equall, but doe vary, as we ſee it doth in divers degrees; then the ſame varying or diverſitie happeneth through the diverſitie of the ground wherein the skill is, and conſequently that there is one particular underſtanding or *one peculiar mind* in every man, and not one univerſall mind common to all men. Alſo it is a generall rule, that the receiver of a thing hath not the thing afore he receive it. For (as *Ariſtotle* ſayth) that which is to receive a thing, muſt needes be firſt utterly voyde of the thing which it receiveth. Now afore that our Sence and Imagination had any being at all, this univerſall comon mind had received and poſſeſſed all things aforehand; and not only received them, but alſo kept them together. For as *Ariſtotle* himſelfe ſayth, that manner of mind is the place of all under kinds and ſortes of things, and thereto hath no leſſe power than the Imagination, to reteine whatſoever the Sences receive. In vaine therefore ſhould that univerſall mind underſtand by our Imaginations, conſidering that it underſtandeth by it ſelfe: in vaine likewiſe ſhould the Imaginations imprint thoſe things in it, which were imprinted in it ſo long afore: and in vaine is *Ariſtotles* ſetting-downe of a workfull underſtanding, which ſhould bring our underſtanding in abilitie, from poſſibilitie into action; if the ſayd onely one vniverſall mind or underſtanding be perfect of it ſelfe from everlaſting, as it followeth to be upon the opinion of *Averrhoes*. Neither is it to ſayd, that although the conceivable underkinds of things have been imprinted everlaſtingly in the ſayd univerſall mind; yet notwithſtanding there needed and Imagination for the underſtanding of them, as there needeth now whenſoever we will uſe the things that we have ſeene or learned afore. For by that reckoning, to learne all manner of Sciences, we needed no more but to bethinke us by imagination, of the things that were already aforehand in the ſayd only univerſall one mind, as we doe the things that have bene printed ſometime in our memories, and are ſomewhat ſlipped out of our remembrance; and ſo might we our ſelves learne all ſciences without a teacher, becauſe that in the ſayd univerſall mind of ours, we ſhould have all the skill that ever any

Ariſtotle in his third book of the Soule.

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man had attained to, in like manner as the perſon that hath once had the skill of Arithmetick or Coſmographie throughly ſettled in his mind, needeth no teacher to teach it him againe, but onely to overturn his owne imagination, and to ſearch his memorie for the finding againe of that which he had layd up there. Now we knowe that whoſoever learneth nothing, knoweth nothig, and that ordinarily he which moſt ſtudyeth, moſt learneth: and that all the toſſing and turmoyling of a mans owne imagination that can be all his life long, will never make him to attaine of himſelfe to ſo much as the very principles of the leaſt ſcience that is. By reaſon whereof it followeth, That we have not the skill of any ſcience in us, untill we either be taught it or find it out by beating our wits about it: and that our imagination ſerveth not to revive the Sciences in us, but to bring them into us, and to plant them in us. And forasmuch as all the Sciences ſhould be in all men from the beginning, if there were but one univerſall mind in all men, [which is not ſo] it followeth that there is in every particular perſon a particular and peculiar mind, and not any one univerſall mind common to all men. Moreover, our mind attaineth after a ſort to the underſtanding of it ſelfe: which thing it could not doe in very deede, if there were but one univerſall mind common to all men. For too underſtrnd it ſelfe, it muſt needes worke upon it ſelfe. But if we beleeve *Averrhoes*, our mind ſhall but onely be wrought upon and receive into it from the Imagination, as a Window receiveth light from the Sunne. Againe, the capacity of the univerſall underſtanding in poſſibilitie, could not doe that. For it behoved it to have ſome other thing beſides itſelfe, to bring it ſelfe into action. And ſurely Imagination could not helpe it, for it *doth but offer up* the ſenſible things unto it, and attaineth not ſo farre as to the things that are to be diſcerned by drift of reaſon. Yet notwithſtanding we underſtand that we underſtand, and we reaſon and iudge both of our Imagination, and alſo of our reaſoning and underſtanding itſelfe. The thing then which doth *ſo enter and pearce into itſelfe*, is another manner of power than an Imagination, or that an univerſall underſtanding in poſſibilitie. What is to be ſayd to this, that of one ſelfeſame Imagination, one ſelfeſame perſon concludeth now after one ſort, and by-and-by after in another ſort; and thereoutof draweth both contrarie arguments and contrarie determinations: or that divers perſon by divers imaginations doe cloſe together in

one will and one minde? Is it possible that this should proceed of an everlasting substance in one selfesame person, seeing that everlasting essence is not subject to any change of time or place? Or that it should proceed of any one selfesame substance in many men, seeing that the imaginations of them be so divers one from another? at least wise if the said substance work not but by such instruments?

Against Alexander of Aphrodise.

As touching the opinion of *Alexander* of *Aphrodise*, who upholdeth a certain universall working minde that imprinteth things in the understanding in possibility, that is to say, in every mans severall capacity, and bringeth it forth into action: the most part of the reasons alleaged afore against *Averroes*, will also serve against him. Howbeit for as much as by this workfull minde, he seemeth to mean God himselfe, there is this much more to be added unto it. That God who is altogether good, and altogether wise, would not imprint in our minde the fond and wicked conceits which we finde there, nor leave so great ignorance and darknesse as we feele there, but would in all men overcome the infection which the body bringeth: and although he inspired not all men alike with his gracious gifts, according to the diversity of their capacities after the manner of a planed Table, yet would he not at leastwise print the World with so many false Portratures and Trains, as every one of us may perceive to be in our selves. Again, were there any such inspiration or influence, it should be either continuall or but by times. If continuall or everlasting, wee should without labour and without cunning understand all that ever our imagination offereth unto us. And if it be but at times, then should it not lie in us to lift or to understand any thing at all, though we would never so fain. For contrariwise, wee have much adoe to understand some things, so as wee must be fain to *win them from our ignorance by piecemeale*, and there be some other things, which we understand by and by as soon as they be put unto us, and when we list our selves. There is then in us a power of Understanding, though very feeble; but yet never the later obedient to our will: which thing cannot be fathered upon God. Also if there be but onely one minde working in all men, there shall be but one selfesame understanding in all men, I meane naturally, notwithstanding that it differ in degrees. For into what place soever the Sunne doth shead his beams, he doth both inlighten it and heat it, howbeit diversly according to the nature and condition of the pla-

ces and things that receive him, ſome more, and ſome leſſe, ſome brighter, and ſome dimlyer. But howſoever the caſe ſtand, his light yeildeth no darkneſſe, nor his heat any cold. So then if the diverſities of mens imaginations do cauſe diverſities of effects in the inſpiration or influence that floweth into the capacitie of our underſtanding; ſurely it muſt needes be after this manner, namely that one man ſhall underſtand one ſelfeſame thing more, and another man leſſe; but not in that any man ſhall take untruth for truth, unright for right, or one thing for another. Now we ſee into how many errors wee be ſubiect, I mean not in ſuch things as this namely, that one man ſeeth better a far off, and another better at hand; but that one man ſeeth white and another ſeeth black (which are things contrary) in one ſelfeſame ground and at one ſelfeſame time. It followeth therefore that divers and ſundrie mindes doe worke in divers perſons, and not one ſelfeſame minde in all perſons. By force of which reaſons and of ſuch others, I ſay that every man ſhall finde in himſelfe and of himſelfe, that every man hath a particular ſoule by himſelfe, that is to ſay, a ſpirituall ſubſtance united to his body, which in reſpect of giving life to the body is as the forme thereof, and in reſpect of giving reaſon, is as the guide of our actions: That in every man there is a certain *Sunbeam of reaſon*, whereby they conceive things and debate upon them; wherethrough it commeth to paſſe, that often times they agree both in the reaſon it ſelfe which is one, and in the manifeſt grounds thereof, and in whatſoever dependeth evidently upon the ſame: That every man hath alſo a peculiar body by himſelfe, and likewiſe peculiar complexion, humours, imaginations, education, cuſtome and trade of life: whereof it commeth that every man takes a diverſe way, yea, and that one ſelfeſame perſon ſwarveth diverſly from the unity of reaſon whereof the path is but one, and the ways to ſtray from it are infinite: That this Sunbeam of reaſon which ſhineth and ſheadeth it ſelfe from our minde, is properly that underſtanding which is termed, *The underſtanding in ability or poſſibility*, which is increaſed and augmented by all the things which it ſeeth, heareth, or lighteth upon, like fire, which gathereth increaſe of ſtrength by the abundance of the fewell that is put upon it, and becommeth after a ſort infinite by ſpreading it ſelfe abroad: Alſo it is the ſame which otherwiſe we call *the Memory of underſtanding, or mindefull Memory*, and it is nothing elſe but an abundance of

Reaſon

Reaſon, and as it were a hoorder up of the continuall influence of the Mind: That the Mind from whence this floweth as from his ſpring, is properly that which they the ſayd *Averrhoes* and *Alexander* do terme the *working or workfull Mind*, which is a certain power or force that can skill to extend reaſon from one thing to another, and to proceede from things ſenſible to things unſenſible, from things movable to things unmovable, from bodily to ſpirituall, from effects to cauſes, and from beginnings to ends by the meane cauſe. *This Mind is in reſpect of Reaſon, as cunning is in reſpect of an Inſtrument or toole*; and Reaſon, as in reſpect of imagination and of the things that are ſenſible, is as an Inſtrument or toole in reſpect of the matter or ſtuffe that it workes upon: Or to ſpeake more fitly, this Mind is unto Reaſon, as the mover of a thing is to the thing that is movable, and Reaſon is to her objects, as the movable thing is to the thing whereunto it is moved. For to reaſon or debate, is nothing els but to proceed from a thing that is underſtoode, to a thing that is not underſtoode, of purpoſe to underſtand it: and the underſtanding thereof is a reſting that inſeweth upon it, as a ſtaying or reſting after moving: That both of them as well the one as the other, are but onely one ſelfeſame ſubſtance, & like as a man, both when he moveth, and when he reſteth is all one and the ſame man, or as the power that moveth the ſinews is one ſelfeſame ſtill, both when it ſtirreth them, and when it holdeth them ſtill, ſo the reaſonable or underſtanding ſoule that is in every man, is but onely one ſelfeſame ſubſtance bodileſſe and immortall, executing his powers partly of it ſelfe, and partly by our bodies. And ſeeing that *Averrhoes* and *Alexander*, make ſo great eſtimation and account of the effects which are wrought in us, that they be inforced to attribute them to ſome uncorruptible and everlaſting minde; let us take of them, that in very truth the thing which worketh ſo great wonders in the body, can be neither ſence, nor body, nor imagination, but a divine, uncorruptible and immortall minde, as they themſelves ſay.

But let us learn the thing of more then them, which all wiſe men teach us, and which every of us can learne of himſelfe; namely that this underſtanding or minde is not one univerſall thing as the ſunne is that ſhineth into all the windows of a Citie, but rather, a particular ſubſtance in every ſeverall man, as a light to lead him in the darkneſſe of this life; for ſurely it was no more difficultie to

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the everlaſting GOD, to create many ſundry ſoules, that every man might have one ſeverally alone by himſelfe, than to have created but onely one ſoule for all men together. But it was far more for his glory, to be known, praiſed, and exalted of many ſoules. yea and more for our welfare to praiſe, exalt, and know him, yea, and to live of our ſelves both in this life, and in the life to come: then if any other univerſall ſpirit, ſoule or minde whatſoever, ſhould have lived and underſtood either in us or after us. Now then for this matter let us conclude, both by reaſon and by antiquity, and by the knowledge that every of us hath of himſelfe; That the ſoule and the body be things divers: that the ſoule is a ſpirit and not a body: That this ſpirit hath in man three abilities or powers, whereof two be exerciſed by the body, and the third worketh of it ſelfe without the body: That theſe three abilities are in the one onely ſoule as in their root: whereof two doe ceaſe whenſoever the body faileth them, and yet notwithſtanding the ſoule abideth whole without abatement of any of her powers, as a craftſman continueth a craftſman though he want tools to work withall: And finally, that this ſoule is a ſubſtance that continueth of it ſelfe, and is unmateriall and ſpirituall, over the which neither death nor corruption can naturally have any power.

And for a concluſion of all that ever I have treated of hitherto in this book, let us maintain, That there is but onely one God, who by his own goodneſſe and wiſdome is the Creator and Governour of the world & of all that is therein: That in the world he created Man after his own image as in reſpect of minde, and after the image of his other creatures as in reſpect of life, ſenſe, and moving, mortall ſo far forth as he holdeth the likeneſſe of a creaturn, and immortall ſo far forth as hee beareth the image of the Creator: That is to wit, in his ſoule: *That he which goeth out of himſelfe to ſee the world, doth forthwith ſee that there is a God*, for his works declare him every where: That hee which will yet ſtill doubt thereof, needeth but to *enter into himſelfe*, and he ſhall *meet him there*, for he ſhall finde there a power which he ſeeth not: That he which believeth there is one God, believeth himſelfe to be *immortall*; for ſuch conſideration could not light into a mortall nature: and that he which believeth himſelf to be immortal, believeth that there is a God, for without the unutterable power of the one God,

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the mortall and immortall could never joyne together: That he which ſeeth the order of the world, the proportion of man, and the harmonie that is in either of them compounded of ſo many contraries, cannot doubt that there is a Providence for the nature which hath furniſhed them therewith, cannot be unfurniſhed therof it ſelfe; but as it once had a care of them, ſo can it not ſhake off the ſame care from them. Thus have we three Articles which follow interchangeably one another. Inſomuch that he which proveth any one of them, doth prove them all three, notwithſtanding that I have treated of every of them ſeverally by it ſelfe. Now let us pray the everlaſting God, that we may glorifie him in his works in this world, and he voutſafe of his mercie to glorifie us one day in the World to come.

(*.*)

AMEN.